Book contents
- Habits
- Habits
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- The Pragmatist Reappraisal of Habit in Contemporary Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory: Introductory Essay
- Part 1 The Sensorimotor Embodiment of Habits
- Part II The Enactment of Habits in Mind and World
- Part III Socially Embeddded and Culturally Extended Habits
- 14 Growing Minds
- 15 “Habit Is Thus the Enormous Flywheel of Society”
- 16 Habit and the Human Lifespan
- 17 Habits and the Enculturated Mind
- 18 Brain, Body, Habit, and the Performative Quality of Aesthetics
- 19 A Habit Ontology for Cognitive and Social Sciences
- 20 Social Ontology between Habits and Social Interactions
- 21 Social Reproduction Feminism and Deweyan Habit Ontology
- Index
- References
19 - A Habit Ontology for Cognitive and Social Sciences
Methodological Individualism, Pragmatist Interactionism, and 4E Cognition
from Part III - Socially Embeddded and Culturally Extended Habits
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 November 2020
- Habits
- Habits
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- The Pragmatist Reappraisal of Habit in Contemporary Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory: Introductory Essay
- Part 1 The Sensorimotor Embodiment of Habits
- Part II The Enactment of Habits in Mind and World
- Part III Socially Embeddded and Culturally Extended Habits
- 14 Growing Minds
- 15 “Habit Is Thus the Enormous Flywheel of Society”
- 16 Habit and the Human Lifespan
- 17 Habits and the Enculturated Mind
- 18 Brain, Body, Habit, and the Performative Quality of Aesthetics
- 19 A Habit Ontology for Cognitive and Social Sciences
- 20 Social Ontology between Habits and Social Interactions
- 21 Social Reproduction Feminism and Deweyan Habit Ontology
- Index
- References
Summary
In this chapter I argue that a Pragmatist framework can offer us a common ontological framework for both social and cognitive sciences, which represents a promising alternative to both internalist and methodological and ontological individualist approaches to sociality. Accordingly, social interaction is constitutive of cognitive phenomena both at the subpersonal and at the personal level, and at the individual and at the collective level. I reconstruct this model as a form of motor social ontology based on the notion of habit and criticize in this light intentionalist takes on social cognition. Finally, I assess recent arguments in favor of the rediscovery of the notion of “habit” within cognitive sciences, and argue that habit ontology can play a foundational role in embodied cognitive sciences insofar as it can give a unified account of 4E cognition, that is of cognition understood as an embodied, enactive, embedded, and extended phenomenon.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- HabitsPragmatist Approaches from Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory, pp. 395 - 416Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020
References
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