Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of maps
- List of tables
- Preface
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Birth of a modern army
- 2 World war and American preparedness
- 3 Coercive power and Wilsonian diplomacy
- 4 “You’re in the army now”
- 5 US army doctrine and industrialized trench warfare
- 6 Over where?
- 7 American Expeditionary Force organization, overseas training, and deployment
- 8 Will the Americans arrive in time?
- 9 Failed expectations: “the military establishment of the United States has fallen down”
- 10 Atlantic ferry
- 11 Neck of the bottle
- 12 Uncertain times
- 13 Cantigny
- 14 Into the breach
- 15 American soldiers in north Russia and Siberia
- 16 The beginning of the end
- 17 Establishment of the American First Army and Saint-Mihiel
- 18 Meuse-Argonne, September 26–October 31
- 19 Breakout, November 1–11
- 20 Epilogue
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
10 - Atlantic ferry
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 July 2014
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of maps
- List of tables
- Preface
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Birth of a modern army
- 2 World war and American preparedness
- 3 Coercive power and Wilsonian diplomacy
- 4 “You’re in the army now”
- 5 US army doctrine and industrialized trench warfare
- 6 Over where?
- 7 American Expeditionary Force organization, overseas training, and deployment
- 8 Will the Americans arrive in time?
- 9 Failed expectations: “the military establishment of the United States has fallen down”
- 10 Atlantic ferry
- 11 Neck of the bottle
- 12 Uncertain times
- 13 Cantigny
- 14 Into the breach
- 15 American soldiers in north Russia and Siberia
- 16 The beginning of the end
- 17 Establishment of the American First Army and Saint-Mihiel
- 18 Meuse-Argonne, September 26–October 31
- 19 Breakout, November 1–11
- 20 Epilogue
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
As the outcome of the war hung in the balance following the first of five German offensives, the War Department and Chaumont confronted critical decisions that might well determine the success or failure of Berlin’s attempt to become the dominant European power. By default the United States had become the manpower reserve for the Entente. Approximately one-half of America’s male population by war’s end had either registered for the draft or was serving in the armed forces. This vast untapped reserve of manpower seemed to represent the Entente’s best hope of thwarting German expansionism.
A credible American force in Europe, however, seemed in the distant future after Ludendorff virtually destroyed the British 5th Army. On April 10, Major General Whigham, the deputy CIGS, informed the British War Cabinet that the United States had only 319,000 men in France and most of these soldiers were not riflemen. Pershing had insisted upon shipping many noncombatants, including many black soldiers who were provided with shovels rather than rifles, to give him the necessary logistical support for an independent force. Of this number only 70,000 US troops were thought ready to enter the fighting line. An additional 10,000 troops were in the United Kingdom. But questions quickly emerged about the combat readiness of even this small number of riflemen. On April 24, the War Cabinet learned that American soldiers “with six months’ training were to be found side by side with raw recruits.” Pershing himself had confirmed that this was true and “expressed surprise at the occurrence, which he supposed was due to the haste with which the orders to push forward troops had been carried out.”
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The American Army and the First World War , pp. 156 - 171Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2014