

actuels des tentatives d'assimilation (ex. les pensionnats, la rafle des années 1960, la relocalisation des Inuit, etc.) sur les communautés (essais 20 à 23), avant d'aborder les problématiques de l'accès à l'eau potable (essai 24) et du manque d'éducation sur les réalités des peuples autochtones (essais 24 et 25). Enfin, dans la cinquième section, l'autrice porte son attention sur le territoire, l'éducation, les droits et les traités. Elle va notamment réfuter avec humour les arguments qui justifiaient la dépossession des droits autochtones au moment colonial (essai 26), l'histoire des traités (essais 27 et 28), le système de réserves et les questions de propriété (essais 29 et 30) avant de compléter l'ouvrage en expliquant l'importance, mais aussi les défis pour les communautés, d'obtenir le plein contrôle de l'éducation de leurs enfants (essai 31).

Bien que l'ouvrage *Écrits autochtones* s'adresse d'abord à un lectorat anglophone (une grande partie des ressources partagées ne sont disponibles qu'en anglais) et que l'utilisation de certains termes ou références puisse porter à confusion, l'ouvrage demeure une lecture éclairante susceptible de capter l'attention du grand public. Tel que mentionné par Chelsea Vowel, on peut en effet ne pas partager toutes les opinions exprimées, mais cet ouvrage parvient avec brio à répondre à son objectif : informer les Canadiennes et les Canadiens sur les réalités et les perspectives des peuples autochtones, ainsi que leur fournir les outils nécessaires afin qu'elles et ils contribuent à améliorer les relations entre les Autochtones et les non-autochtones.

*Écrits autochtones* est par ailleurs autant un effort académique de vulgarisation de l'état des connaissances qu'un manifeste en faveur d'une réelle décolonisation qui ne peut passer que par l'éducation. En effet, comme l'affirme l'autrice, « sans éducation, il ne peut y avoir de justice et tant qu'il n'y aura pas de justice, il n'y aura pas de paix » (304). Près d'un an après le choc engendré par l'identification de 215 tombes anonymes d'enfants à proximité d'un ancien pensionnat autochtone à Kamloops, en Colombie-Britannique, la traduction du livre en français arrive à un moment charnière où 44 % de la population canadienne reconnaît ne pas avoir une bonne compréhension des expériences passées et présentes des peuples autochtones (Canadian Reconciliation Barometer, 2021) et que selon un autre sondage, 10 % seulement des Canadiennes et des Canadiens affirment être très familiers avec l'histoire du système des pensionnats (Assembly of First Nation, 2021).

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## Reclaiming Populism: How Economic Fairness Can Win Back Disenchanted Voters

Eric Protzer and Paul Summerville, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2022, pp. 213 (paperback)

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When my political cinema class watches Bong Joon Ho's 2019 Oscar-winning *Parasite*, a theme that unfailingly provokes a strong response is the unfairness of family-social networks that pit

South Korea's "dirt spoons" against "gold spoons" (Chen, 2019). While suitably troubled by the country's Gini coefficient (over 68 per cent, according to the World Bank), the class appears more upset by the "fated" misery of *Parasite*'s Kim family, as they toil for and manipulate the privileged Park household. Poor social mobility is felt to be worse than inequality. This is the key to what drives global populism according to Paul Summerville (University of Victoria) and Eric Protzer (Harvard's Growth Lab).

As the authors note in their preface, the working title for *Reclaiming Populism* was *Defeating Populism*. Indeed, the opening chapter offers a survey of mainstream theories about "populist eruptions" as a threat to liberal democracy, beyond the headlines on Brexit, Trump and Marine Le Pen. As an "anti-pluralist politics" resulting mainly from economic inequality that supposedly benefits elites, populism is hardly welcome. But what if the culprit is "public policy regimes that leave citizens vulnerable to economic unfairness"—which is "wholly unrelated to prescriptions like deporting immigrants, regulating online speech, soaking the rich, or shutting down international trade?" (37). For Summerville and Protzer, hard evidence from economies that underwent deep shocks ties populism not to their magnitude but to "whether those outcomes [notably job losses] are fairly deserved." Trade shocks, such as from the upsurge in imports from China, do matter; but it's the policy response and ensuing vulnerability of the economy that underlies populist trends.

In their defence of reclaiming populism, the authors unpack the ethics of fairness as a primary value (ahead of equality) and the ways in which this can be advanced in national public policy in Western liberal settings. They do so succinctly, with quantitative as well as qualitative arguments that build on Rawlsian distributive justice precepts. Fairness not only "entails equal opportunity" but also resisting "enforced equal outcomes" (52–53). Neoliberalism's myopic view of the market fails to deliver this; solidarity with the disadvantaged smooths the quest for just deserts (55–56). The United States has among the world's highest per capita GDP levels and growth rates, along with dynamic innovation. But it also has among the lowest social mobility rates in the developed world, and it had the second highest poverty rate in the OECD in 2017—which, say the authors, "strongly contributed to the Trump phenomenon and all the disruption it has created" (144). A similar linkage is found in France, as well as in other West European countries that have experienced populist drives.

However, to claim that economic unfairness is the primary explanator, regardless of local histories, is less tenable. Whose perceptions count when ostensibly democratic polities favour particular types of privilege and influence? In settler states—including Australia and Canada, Chile, Israel and the United States—economic fairness for Indigenous peoples has ranked nowhere; yet opposition to remedial policies on resource rights figures in populist campaigns. Can economic fairness chiefly explain why populist forces prevail in Quebec on issues of religious symbols and sovereignty? Is Islamophobia to be dismissed as mere scapegoating when it is systemic and involves elites and mass publics (Lean, 2017; Sajoo, 2020; Zine, 2022)? Subversion of democratic checks and balances, as well as of minority rights, is endemic to populism, not incidental (Waldron, 2020; Arato and Cohen, 2021).

Globally, economic inequality in Brazil, South Africa and India puts their vast sectors of the most impoverished at the bottom of the world's poorest, displacing China's now better-off poorest (Milanovic, 2022). All three countries have been in the headlines on populism, driven by political and economic factors—from religious nationalism and apartheid's legacy to anti-establishment militancy. Ideological perceptions about just deserts (Hindutva, resistance to COVID-19 and environmental measures, anti-Indigenous sentiment) frame the discourse on equal citizenship. Much the same is true of Recep Erdoğan's Turkey (Temelkuran, 2019). When the ethics of fair play in the real world are largely on the side of populism's targets rather than the perpetrators, it's hard to envisage a reclaiming that still serves the tenets of both constitutional and human-rights accountability.

This study will appeal to a broad academic audience, with its readily accessible take on political and economic theory and its use of narratives to keep the discussion engaging throughout. While the focus on developed countries may somewhat limit the appeal when populism has gone global, it does make for a shorter and tighter text.

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## Intelligence as Democratic Statecraft: Accountability and Governance of Civil-Intelligence Relations across the Five Eyes Security Community—the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand

Christian Leuprecht and Hayley McNorton, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021, pp. 272

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At a time in the early 1970s when many Americans (and more than a few others) were expressing mounting misgivings about the Nixon administration's lack of "accountability," Arthur Schlesinger Jr. quoted to effect a remark Thorstein Veblen had made more than a half century earlier. The famous economist had been reflecting on the impact the recently ended Great War had had upon the manner in which democratic governments were handling the challenges posed by the intelligence-gathering responsibilities they had been assuming as a result of the exigencies of the fighting. Veblen was sure of two things, now that the war was over. The first was that because democratic statecraft was increasingly growing "devoted to the gainful pursuit of international intrigue," liberal governments would be forced to conduct more and more of their "ordinary work by night and cloud." The second was that democratic citizenry would be willing, indeed quite happy, to acquiesce in furtiveness on the grounds that secrecy was essential for national security (Schlesinger, 1973: 337).

For a time, it seemed as if Veblen had been correct on both counts. Democratic governments, buffeted by the storms touched off by great-power rivalry during the first half of the