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  3. Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory

This series is intended to be the forum for the most innovative and challenging work in the theory of rational decision. Focusing on contemporary developments of the interplay among philosophy, psychology, economics, and statistics, the series addresses foundational theoretical issues, often quite technical ones, and therefore assumes a distinctly philosophical character.

  • General Editors: Brian Skyrms
  • Advisory Editors: Ernest W. Adams, Ken Binmore, Jeremy Butterfield, Persi Diaconis, William L. Harper, John Harsanyi, Richard C. Jeffrey, Wolfgang Spohn, Patrick Suppes, Amos Tversky, Sandy Zabell

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19 results in Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory

Creating Modern Probability
  • Its Mathematics, Physics and Philosophy in Historical Perspective
  • Jan von Plato
  • Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    28 January 1994
  • This is the only book to chart the history and development of modern probability theory. It shows how in the first thirty years of this century probability theory became a mathematical science. The author also traces the development of probabilistic concepts and theories in statistical and quantum physics. There are chapters dealing with chance phenomena, as well as the main mathematical theories of today, together with their foundational and philosophical problems. Among the theorists whose work is treated at some length are Kolmogorov, von Mises and de Finetti. The principal audience for the book comprises philosophers and historians of science, mathematicians concerned with probability and statistics, and physicists. The book will also interest anyone fascinated by twentieth-century scientific developments because the birth of modern probability is closely tied to the change from a determinist to an indeterminist world-view.

Probability and the Art of Judgment
  • Richard Jeffrey
  • Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    27 March 1992
  • Richard Jeffrey is beyond dispute one of the most distinguished and influential philosophers working in the field of decision theory and the theory of knowledge. His work is distinctive in showing the interplay of epistemological concerns with probability and utility theory. Not only has he made use of standard probabilistic and decision theoretic tools to clarify concepts of evidential support and informed choice, he has also proposed significant modifications of the standard Bayesian position in order that it provide a better fit with actual human experience. Probability logic is viewed not as a source of judgment but as a framework for explaining the implications of probabilistic judgments and their mutual compatability. This collection of essays spans a period of some 35 years and includes what have become some of the classic works in the literature. There is also one completely new piece, while in many instances Jeffrey includes afterthoughts on the older essays.

Rethinking the Foundations of Statistics
  • Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld
  • Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    13 August 1999
  • This important collection of essays is a synthesis of foundational studies in Bayesian decision theory and statistics. An overarching topic of the collection is understanding how the norms for Bayesian decision making should apply in settings with more than one rational decision maker and then tracing out some of the consequences of this turn for Bayesian statistics. There are four principal themes to the collection: cooperative, non-sequential decisions; the representation and measurement of 'partially ordered' preferences; non-cooperative, sequential decisions; and pooling rules and Bayesian dynamics for sets of probabilities. The volume will be particularly valuable to philosophers concerned with decision theory, probability, and statistics, statisticians, mathematicians, and economists.

Symmetry and its Discontents
  • Essays on the History of Inductive Probability
  • S. L. Zabell
  • Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    06 June 2005
  • This volume brings together a collection of essays on the history and philosophy of probability and statistics by one of the eminent scholars in these subjects. Written over the last fifteen years, they fall into three broad categories. The first deals with the use of symmetry arguments in inductive probability, in particular, their use in deriving rules of succession (Carnap's 'continuum of inductive methods'). The second group deals with four outstanding individuals who made lasting contributions to probability and statistics in very different ways: Frank Ramsey, R. A. Fisher, Alan Turing, and Abraham de Moivre. The last group of essays deals with the problem of 'predicting the unpredictable' - making predictions when the range of possible outcomes is unknown in advance. The essays weave together the history and philosophy of these subjects and document the fascination that they have exercised for more than three centuries.

Foundations of Probability with Applications
  • Selected Papers 1974–1995
  • Patrick Suppes, Mario Zanotti
  • Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    13 November 1996
  • This is an important collection of essays dealing with the foundations of probability that will be of value to philosophers of science, mathematicians, statisticians, psychologists and educationalists. The collection falls into three parts. Part I comprises five essays on the axiomatic foundations of probability. Part II contains seven articles on probabilistic causality and quantum mechanics, with an emphasis on the existence of hidden variables. The third part consists of a single extended essay applying probabilistic theories of learning to practical questions of education: it incorporates extensive data analysis. Patrick Suppes is one of the world's foremost philosophers in the area of probability, and has made many contributions to both the theoretical and practical side of education. The statistician Mario Zanotti is a long-time collaborator.

Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction
  • Edited by Cristina Bicchieri, Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara
  • Published online:
    05 November 2011
    Print publication:
    28 August 1992
  • There has been a great deal of interaction among game theorists, philosophers and logicians in certain foundational problems concerning rationality, the formalization of knowledge and practical reasoning, and models of learning and deliberation. This volume brings together the work of some of the pre-eminent figures in their respective disciplines, all of whom are engaged in research at the forefront of their fields. Together they offer a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic and epistemology in the formal models of knowledge, belief, deliberation and learning, and in the relationship between Bayesian decision theory and game theory, as well as between bounded rationality and computational complexity.

The Design Inference
  • Eliminating Chance through Small Probabilities
  • William A. Dembski
  • Published online:
    06 July 2010
    Print publication:
    13 September 1998
  • The design inference uncovers intelligent causes by isolating their key trademark: specified events of small probability. Just about anything that happens is highly improbable, but when a highly improbable event is also specified (i.e. conforms to an independently given pattern) undirected natural causes lose their explanatory power. Design inferences can be found in a range of scientific pursuits from forensic science to research into the origins of life to the search for extraterrestrial intelligence. This challenging and provocative 1998 book shows how incomplete undirected causes are for science and breathes new life into classical design arguments. It will be read with particular interest by philosophers of science and religion, other philosophers concerned with epistemology and logic, probability and complexity theorists, and statisticians.

Causal Asymmetries
  • Daniel M. Hausman
  • Published online:
    20 April 2010
    Print publication:
    28 July 1998
  • This book, by one of the pre-eminent philosophers of science writing today, offers the most comprehensive account available of causal asymmetries. Causation is asymmetrical in many different ways. Causes precede effects; explanations cite causes not effects. Agents use causes to manipulate their effects; they don't use effects to manipulate their causes. Effects of a common cause are correlated; causes of a common effect are not. This book explains why a relationship that is asymmetrical in one of these regards is asymmetrical in the others. Hausman discovers surprising hidden connections between theories of causation and traces them all to an asymmetry of independence. This is a major book for philosophers of science that will also prove insightful to economists and statisticians.

Equilibrium and Rationality
  • Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules
  • Paul Weirich
  • Published online:
    18 March 2010
    Print publication:
    28 January 1998
  • This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The book also includes a procedure for identifying strategic equilibria in ideal normal-form games. In synthesizing decision theory and game theory in a powerful way this book will be of particular interest to all philosophers concerned with decision theory and game theory as well as economists and other social scientists.

Knowledge and Inquiry
  • Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi
  • Erik J. Olsson
  • Published online:
    05 March 2010
    Print publication:
    13 February 2006
  • Isaac Levi has explored the principles of American pragmatism in greater depth and more consistency than others before him. The result is a sophisticated and powerful philosophical system whose key elements stand in stark opposition not only to mainstream epistemology, but also to the positions of other contemporary authors writing in the same pragmatist tradition. The essays in this volume, written by some of philosophy's finest scholars, contribute substantially to the understanding and appraisal of Levi's work. Included in this volume are Levi's extensive and provocative replies to his critics, which offer access to his thinking on a wide range of topics. The introduction provides a concise, systematic presentation of the cornerstone of Levi's pragmatism. Suitable for students and scholars who are interested in American pragmatism in general and Isaac Levi's work in particular, this book is an ideal companion to Levi's own writings.

Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality
  • Robert C. Koons
  • Published online:
    06 January 2010
    Print publication:
    31 January 1992
  • This book develops a framework for analysing strategic rationality, a notion central to contemporary game theory, which is the formal study of the interaction of rational agents and which has proved extremely fruitful in economics, political theory and business management. The author argues that a logical paradox lies at the root of a number of persistent puzzles in game theory, in particular those concerning rational agents who seek to establish some kind of reputation. Building on the work of Parsons, Burge, Gaifman and Barwise and Etchemendy, Robert Koons constructs a context-sensitive solution to the whole family of liar-like paradoxes including, for the first time, a detailed account of how the interpretation of paradoxical statements is fixed by context. This analysis provides an understanding of how the rational agent model can account for the emergence of rules, practices and institutions.

The Concept of Probability in Statistical Physics
  • Y. M. Guttmann
  • Published online:
    12 November 2009
    Print publication:
    13 July 1999
  • Foundational issues in statistical mechanics and the more general question of how probability is to be understood in the context of physical theories are both areas that have been neglected by philosophers of physics. This book fills an important gap in the literature by providing a most systematic study of how to interpret probabilistic assertions in the context of statistical mechanics. The book explores both subjectivist and objectivist accounts of probability, and takes full measure of work in the foundations of probability theory, in statistical mechanics, and in mathematical theory. It will be of particular interest to philosophers of science, physicists and mathematicians interested in foundational issues, and also to historians of science.

Physical Causation
  • Phil Dowe
  • Published online:
    13 October 2009
    Print publication:
    03 July 2000
  • This book, published in 2000, is a clear account of causation based firmly in contemporary science. Dowe discusses in a systematic way, a positive account of causation: the conserved quantities account of causal processes which he has been developing over the last ten years. The book describes causal processes and interactions in terms of conserved quantities: a causal process is the worldline of an object which possesses a conserved quantity, and a causal interaction involves the exchange of conserved quantities. Further, things that are properly called cause and effect are appropriately connected by a set of causal processes and interactions. The distinction between cause and effect is explained in terms of a version of the fork theory: the direction of a certain kind of ordered pattern of events in the world. This particular version has the virtue that it allows for the possibility of backwards causation, and therefore time travel.

Probabilistic Causality
  • Ellery Eells
  • Published online:
    07 October 2009
    Print publication:
    29 March 1991
  • In this important book, Ellery Eells explores and refines philosophical conceptions of probabilistic causality. In a probabilistic theory of causation, causes increase the probability of their effects rather than necessitate their effects in the ways traditional deterministic theories have specified. Philosophical interest in this subject arises from attempts to understand population sciences as well as indeterminism in physics. Taking into account issues involving spurious correlation, probabilistic causal interaction, disjunctive causal factors, and temporal ideas, Professor Eells advances the analysis of what it is for one factor to be a positive causal factor for another. A salient feature of the book is a theory of token level probabilistic causation in which the evolution of the probability of a later event from an earlier event is central. This will be a book of crucial significance to philosophers of science and metaphysicians; it will also prove stimulating to many economists, psychologists, and physicists.

Betting on Theories
  • Patrick Maher
  • Published online:
    22 September 2009
    Print publication:
    26 February 1993
  • This book is a major contribution to decision theory, focusing on the question of when it is rational to accept scientific theories. The author examines both Bayesian decision theory and confirmation theory, refining and elaborating the views of Ramsey and Savage. He argues that the most solid foundation for confirmation theory is to be found in decision theory, and he provides a decision-theoretic derivation of principles for how many probabilities should be revised over time. Professor Maher defines a notion of accepting a hypothesis, and then shows that it is not reducible to probability and that it is needed to deal with some important questions in the philosophy of science. A Bayesian decision-theoretic account of rational acceptance is provided together with a proof of the foundations for this theory. A final chapter shows how this account can be used to cast light on such vexed issues as verisimilitude and scientific realism.

The Structure of Values and Norms
  • Sven Ove Hansson
  • Published online:
    13 August 2009
    Print publication:
    02 July 2001
  • Formal representations of values and norms are employed in several academic disciplines and specialties, such as economics, jurisprudence, decision theory and social choice theory. Sven Ove Hansson closely examines such foundational issues as the values of wholes and the values of their parts, the connections between values and norms, how values can be decision-guiding and the structure of normative codes with formal precision. Models of change in both preferences and norms are offered, as well as a method to base the logic of norms on that of preferences. Hansson has developed a unified formal representation of values and norms that reflects both their static and their dynamic properties. This formalized treatment, carried out in terms of both informal value theory and precise logical detail, will contribute to the clarification of certain issues in the basic philosophical theory of values and norms.

Decision Space
  • Multidimensional Utility Analysis
  • Paul Weirich
  • Published online:
    28 July 2009
    Print publication:
    27 August 2001
  • In Decision Space: Multidimensional Utility Analysis, first published in 2001, Paul Weirich increases the power and versatility of utility analysis and in the process advances decision theory. Combining traditional and novel methods of option evaluation into one systematic method of analysis, multidimensional utility analysis is a valuable tool. It provides formulations of important decision principles, such as the principle to maximize expected utility; enriches decision theory in solving recalcitrant decision problems; and provides in particular for the cases in which an expert must make a decision for a group of people. The multiple dimensions of this analysis create a decision space broad enough to accommodate all factors affecting an option's utility. The book will be of interest to advanced students and professionals working in the subject of decision theory, as well as to economists and other social scientists.

The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
  • James M. Joyce
  • Published online:
    25 July 2009
    Print publication:
    13 April 1999
  • This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. The early chapters of the book introduce the non-specialist to the rudiments of expected utility theory. The major technical advance offered by the book is a 'representation theorem' that shows that both causal decision theory and its main rival, Richard Jeffrey's logic of decision, are both instances of a more general conditional decision theory. The book solves a long-standing problem for Jeffrey's theory by showing for the first time how to obtain a unique utility and probability representation for preferences and judgements of comparative likelihood. The book also contains a major new discussion of what it means to suppose that some event occurs or that some proposition is true. The most complete and robust defence of causal decision theory available.

Interpreting Probability
  • Controversies and Developments in the Early Twentieth Century
  • David Howie
  • Published online:
    07 July 2009
    Print publication:
    08 August 2002
  • The term probability can be used in two main senses. In the frequency interpretation it is a limiting ratio in a sequence of repeatable events. In the Bayesian view, probability is a mental construct representing uncertainty. This 2002 book is about these two types of probability and investigates how, despite being adopted by scientists and statisticians in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Bayesianism was discredited as a theory of scientific inference during the 1920s and 1930s. Through the examination of a dispute between two British scientists, the author argues that a choice between the two interpretations is not forced by pure logic or the mathematics of the situation, but depends on the experiences and aims of the individuals involved. The book should be of interest to students and scientists interested in statistics and probability theories and to general readers with an interest in the history, sociology and philosophy of science.