The right to respect for family life is one of the most important and closely protected rights that children possess. It is widely recognised that loving, secure and stable relationships with trusted carers are fundamental to a child’s well-being and development. Family relationships are also vital to a child’s sense of identity and place in the world. Despite the importance of the right to family life, its application in practice can undermine the very relationships that it seeks to protect. The mutual nature of the right to family life means that it is particularly susceptible to attempts by adults to clothe their own interests in the language of children’s rights. This chapter explores the right to family life and the extent to which it protects biological relatedness, legal parenthood and practical relationships of care and responsibility. Particular attention is given to child arrangements disputes, adoption and post-adoption with birth families.

This chapter discusses the growing body of research that examines the social cognitive processes of jurors used when making verdict or sentencing decisions. This includes the empirical findings related to priming ideas and attitudes and impression formation. The chapter then discusses heuristics, or cognitive “shortcuts,” that jurors employ during their decision-making processes in trials and deliberations. For instance, there is a tendency for jurors to over-rely on dispositional attributions, stereotypes, and schemas. Cognitive biases that jurors are prone to, such as the hindsight bias, the outcome bias, and counterfactual thinking, will also be discussed in the context of evaluating evidence and making verdict decisions, along with the potential of debiasing techniques. Finally, jurors’ biases and prejudices regarding factors, such as race, gender, and religion, and how they relate to decision-making are examined. The chapter also addresses areas of social cognition that have not yet been explored in current research and provides recommendations for future directions.

This chapter uses a case-based approach to describe electrographic patterns associated with encephalopathy. Global cerebral dysfunction (encephalopathy) is typically characterized by a “low and slow” record that is not specific to any particular etiology. Severe forms show background discontinuity, absence of a posterior dominant rhythm, and loss of reactivity. Generalized rhythmic delta activity (GRDA) and generalized periodic discharges (GPDs) with triphasic morphology (triphasic waves) are two common patterns seen in encephalopathic patients. As with other rhythmic and/or periodic patterns, it is important to recognize that these patterns may lie on an ictal–interictal injury continuum (IIIC) and may need appropriate management. Cyclical alternating pattern of encephalopathy (CAPE) is a pattern of spontaneously alternating background changes that may have prognostic implications.

In this chapter, I analyze data on over 300 individual members of the communist regimes in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. I explore how an abrupt post-Stalinist transition in the wake of the Soviet dictator’s death affected elite cohesion and the relationship between ruling coalitions and their coercive subordinates. Specifically, I test whether breakdowns in elite cohesion led to more punishment of coercive agency chiefs, and their more frequent removal from office. My test of this argument exploits both variation in elite cohesion across Stalinist and post-Stalinist regimes, and variation in Soviet authority over different types of coercive agents. I analyze original data on members of communist ruling coalitions to estimate survival models of their tenures. I find that the tenures of Defense Ministers and secret police chiefs were similar under Stalinist coalitions, but secret police chiefs had significantly shorter tenures than Defense Ministers under post-Stalinist coalitions.

My name is Alane Thomas. I have a Master’s degree in Social Work, a Master of Arts in Criminal Justice, and a clinical social work license. I have been in the social work field for 10 years and worked in the victim advocacy field for 2.5 years. I have worked with sexual assault survivors and domestic violence victims, families in child protective services, and clients in a behavioral health hospital setting, and have provided individual, couples, and family therapy in a private practice setting. I have had the opportunity to experience what goes into making decisions to protect children and adults who are at risk of or are actively experiencing abuse and neglect.

Although civil trials provide for the lawful resolution of many kinds of disputes, the vast majority of civil matters are resolved through other processes: Negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. This chapter provides an overview of the main psychological and structural factors that influence disputants’ decisions to select and use these primary alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes. Further, the chapter discusses the psychology of decision-making in the context of alternative dispute resolution, including identifying what constitutes successful outcomes and how biases and other tendencies can prevent parties from realizing these outcomes. Finally, the chapter addresses research on the ways in which non-parties such as mediators, facilitators, arbitrators, and judges can improve (or diminish) the likelihood that parties’ voices will be heard, that parties will be satisfied with the process, and that the selected process will result in substantively satisfactory outcomes. Major research gaps and policy implications are identified and discussed.

This chapter explores the question of what it means for a lawmaking institution to speak and act in our name. We maintain that different institutions can do so in different ways; even identical laws may have different meanings and significance depending on their institutional source.

We challenge the commonly held assumption that the institutional source of a legal norm – be it the constitution, legislation, and so on – does not affect its nature. We argue that institutions are not merely vessels through which norms get public recognition. When different institutions use identically worded norms, say, “everyone is equally entitled to X,” they may nevertheless produce different norms and provide different goods. For instance, a constitutional protection of a basic right differs from a statutory right to the same right, not because the former is less likely to be changed but because a constitutional decision marks the right in question as one that makes no essential reference to the actual choice of the majority of the political community. We extend this argument to other institutional settings, especially the common law tradition of judge-made law. We further discuss the doctrinal implications of the argument, defending a new kind of remedy: institutional remedies.

Biases in decision-making based on race, ethnicity, social class, gender, sexual orientation, and other social identities are pervasive in the criminal justice and legal systems. Likewise, the positionality of legal actors and lay people from diverse groups both influences and constrains legally relevant judgments. This chapter uses a case study of racially biased judgments in the criminal justice and legal systems to illustrate how judgment processes can lead to unequal outcomes across social groups. It then describes ways in which law-psychology can expand research on diversity in legal decision-making, addressing issues related to social class, discrimination against LGBTQ+ people, and reproductive decision-making by women. It also discusses frameworks and perspectives that provide valuable insights on legal decision-making but which often are overlooked by psycholegal scholars, including intersectionality, Critical Race Theory, and the abolition movement. The chapter concludes by examining the limits of a decision-making framework for understanding unequal outcomes in legally relevant contexts, which frequently are the result of structural and implicit biases in addition to deliberate judgments.

Social workers make decisions every day involving the protection of children and/or adults who are at risk of, or are experiencing, abuse and neglect, exercising power and authority derived from law. Social workers must act within the law: “doing things right.” Accountable, legally literate practice additionally includes standards from administrative law when statutory duties are used. However, decision-making frequently also raises ethical dilemmas, including whether, when, and how to intervene in people’s lives. Practice must, therefore, be ethically literate: “doing right things.” Human rights, equality, and social justice issues will also feature in social work decision-making: “right thinking.” This chapter presents a framework for social worker decision-making that is legally and ethically, but also emotionally, relationally, organizationally and knowledge, literate. It proposes that this framework is transferable across the different jurisdictions within which social workers practice, and that it helps social workers to make good as well as lawful decisions.

The extent to which reported subscores meet added-value criteria is broadly assessed using actual data from thirty-six operational testing programs.