This chapter develops the conceptual basis and theoretical framework for the study, relating to relevant literatures in intelligence studies, peace studies and constructivist theories in IR. It discusses normative versus analytical approaches to warnings in foreign affairs and explicates problematic assumptions in the literature. It argues that warnings come in various forms and may contain a variable mix of knowledge, relevance and action claims. They can differ greatly in their senders’ intentions and relationships to recipients. Therefore, warning impact needs to be measured in a more nuanced way than whether warnings led to effective preventive action. The chapter develops a theoretical framework that draws on the most relevant insights from literatures in social psychology, advocacy and political communication to explain when warnings are persuasive. It distinguishes between outside-in warnings from NGOs and news media and inside-up warnings through intelligence analysts and diplomats. The framework elaborates which variables can best account for differences in persuasive success and how they may interact.

The concluding chapter draws on findings from preceding chapters to return to the original question: What makes warnings about conflicts in foreign countries persuasive? It argues that existing research in conflict prevention has tended to over-count warnings and exaggerate their persuasiveness. Most analytical products dealing with the political situation in foreign countries did not clearly announce themselves as warnings, or their warning content was highly hedged, opaque or hidden within conventional reporting or current intelligence. At the same time, inside-up warnings are influenced by outside-in warnings and the broader information environment created by media and NGOs. Six ‘first order’ factors are most significant to explain the findings as they shape persuasion paths: diagnostic difficulties specific to each case, the level of political equity at stake in a given country, individual capacities and the credibility of inside-up warners, the degree of engagement of a small group of highly capable and credible outside-in warners, the degree of agenda competition and, finally, the role of pre-existing policy biases. The chapter examines what these findings mean for prospective warners, which questions they should ask themselves, and how they can increase the chances of their warnings being listened to and, perhaps, even heeded.