Collective decision-making is often taken as an ‘institutional fact’ when it comes to supreme and constitutional courts. In this article, we focus on the example of the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal, or STF) to argue that this feature should not be assumed from the outset, as it does not necessarily hold, across countries, for all relevant powers that courts may have. As this example illustrates, the assignment to individual Justices of three distinct powers, namely agenda setting, position taking, and decision making, can have profound effects on the legislative status quo outside the court, amounting in some circumstances to a form of individual judicial review. This expanded typology of court powers both points to an underexplored spectrum for comparing different courts and makes it necessary to discuss if and how particular distributions of such powers within multi-member courts are normatively justified. In the specific case of the STF, we argue that the specific combination of individual allocations of agenda setting and decision-making powers, which gives rise in practice to the possibility of individual judicial review, cannot be reconciled with basic tenets of constitutional theory.

How large should a monetary policy committee be? Which voting rule should a monetary policy committee adopt? This paper builds on Condorcet's jury theorem to analyse the relationships between committee size and voting rules in a model where policy discussions are subject to a time constraint. It suggests that in large committees majority voting is likely to enhance policy outcomes. Under unanimity (consensus) it is preferable to limit the size of the committee. Finally, supermajority voting rules are social contrivances that contribute to policy performance in a more uncertain environment, when initial policy proposals are less likely to be correct, or when payoffs are asymmetric.

This paper explores some of the major changes in the practices of international organizations that have occurred in the decades since The Doctrine of the Legal Equality of States was published. First, much international law-making in contemporary international organizations consists of regulation and administration whose creation, content and application differs significantly from that of traditional forms of international legislation associated with international organizations. Second, in a highly fragmented international legal order, twenty-first century international organizations increasingly interact with each other in a wide variety of law-making and operational capacities. Given these changing roles and activities, it is no longer sufficient to view international organizations primarily as fora through which other actors – typically states – pursue their interests. Rather, twenty-first century international organizations often pursue their own goals and agendas as autonomous actors in international affairs. These developments have rendered traditional debates over sovereign equality within international organizations substantially less salient than they were when Legal Equality was written. In the future, the cutting-edge doctrinal and jurisprudential issues raised by twenty-first century international organizations largely will arise out of interactions among international organizations. As a result, legal scholars should shift their attention from inter-state interactions and processes within any particular IO to interactions and processes among twenty-first century IOs. Of course, decentering sovereign equality does not mean that the international system should celebrate or enshrine legal inequality. Rather, the international community should develop other concepts that incorporate the notions of inclusiveness and egalitarianism associated with sovereign equality, but that are more applicable to the actions of twenty-first century IOs.

Vote-buying is widely used by parties in developing countries to influence the outcome of elections. We examine the impact of vote-buying on growth. We consider a model with a poverty trap where redistribution can promote growth. We show that vote-buying contributes to the persistence of poverty as taxed wealthy people buy votes from poor people. We then show that there exists a democratic constitution that breaks vote-buying and promotes growth. Such a constitution involves rotating agenda setting, a taxpayer-protection rule, and repeated voting. The latter rule makes vote-buying prohibitively costly.

L'analyse théorique de la vulnérabilité des règles de vote aux comportements stratégi-ques montre que le caractère plus ou moins manipulable d'une règle dépend du concept d'équilibre auquel l'on se réfère. Une question cruciale est de savoir si l'on doit ou non tenir compte des possibilités qu'ont les électeurs de réagir en présence d'une menace de manipulation. Nous étudions cette question à l'aide d'une approche expérimentale. Nos résultats tendent à valider empiriquement la notion de réaction.