We report the results of a field experiment designed to increase honest disclosure of claims at a U.S. state unemployment agency. Individuals filing claims were randomized to a message (‘nudge’) intervention, while an off-the-shelf machine learning algorithm calculated claimants’ risk for committing fraud (underreporting earnings). We study the causal effects of algorithmic targeting on the effectiveness of nudge messages: Without algorithmic targeting, the average treatment effect of the messages was insignificant; in contrast, the use of algorithmic targeting revealed significant heterogeneous treatment effects across claimants. Claimants predicted to behave unethically by the algorithm were more likely to disclose earnings when receiving a message relative to a control condition, with claimants predicted to most likely behave unethically being almost twice as likely to disclose earnings when shown a message. In addition to providing a potential blueprint for targeting more costly interventions, our study offers a novel perspective for the use and efficiency of data science in the public sector without violating citizens’ agency. However, we caution that, while algorithms can enable tailored policy, their ethical use must be ensured at all times.

People frequently engage in dishonest behavior, which entails costs to society. A common advice to increase honesty is to enhance observability. However, previous research produced conflicting findings, making it unclear when and why observability increases honesty. Here we show that observability enhances honesty when observers can gossip to relevant others (i.e., to future interaction partners who can influence the gossip target’s outcome), because it increases reputational concern. In 2 incentivized and pre-registered studies, participants privately rolled a die 30 times and were informed that reporting higher numbers would lead to higher outcomes (total N = 1608; 28650 observations). We manipulated observability and gossip. Both studies revealed that gossip to relevant others decreased dishonest reporting, whereas mere observation did not. Importantly, reputational concern partly mediated the impact of gossip on dishonesty. Moreover, gossip influenced recipients’ trust in gossip targets, with messages denoting dishonesty swaying trust more than messages denoting honesty. Our findings demonstrate when and why observability promotes honesty.

While unethical acts are common in the business world, we know little about how employees react when they observe coworkers caught engaging in unethical behavior. This is both theoretically and practically relevant, given that many supervisors take unethical behavior in the workplace very seriously. Drawing on appraisal theory, we argue that observing a coworker caught engaging in unethical behavior elicits feelings of schadenfreude. Then, this positive feeling spills over to a separate task and enhances performance. Finally, we suggest that trait empathy can weaken this effect because individuals with high trait empathy are more likely to understand the motivations of the person caught. Across two studies, our results showed that perpetrators getting caught increased schadenfreude among observers, which then increased their subsequent task performance. However, trait empathy did not significantly affect these results. Our work contributes to the literature on unethical behavior and emotions in the workplace.

Are people honest about the extent to which they engage in unethical behaviors? We report an experiment examining the relation between self-reported risky unethical tendencies and actual dishonest behavior. Participants’ self-reported risk taking tendencies were assessed using the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) questionnaire, while actual self-serving dishonesty was assessed using a private coin tossing task. In this task, participants predicted the outcome of coin tosses, held the predictions in mind, and reported whether their predictions were correct. Thus, the task allowed participants to lie about whether their predictions were correct. We manipulated whether reporting higher correct scores increased (vs. not) participants monetary payoff. Results revealed a positive relation between self-reported unethical risky tendencies and actual dishonesty. The effect was limited to the condition in which dishonesty was self-serving. Our results suggest liars are aware of their dishonest tendencies and are potentially not ashamed of them.

Do people cheat more when they have something to gain, or when they have something to lose? The answer to this question isn’t straightforward, as research is mixed when it comes to understanding how unethical people will be when they might acquire something good versus avoid something bad. To wit, research has found that people cheat more in a loss (vs. gain) frame, yet research on regulatory focus has found that people cheat more in a promotion focus (where the focus is on acquiring gains) than in a prevention focus (where the focus is on avoiding losses). Through a large-scale field study containing 332,239 observations including 27,350 transgressions, we address the contradictory results of gain/loss frames and regulatory focus on committing unethical behavior in a context that contains a high risk of detecting unethical behavior (NFL football games). Our results replicated the separate effects of more cheating in a loss frame, and more cheating in a promotion focus. Furthermore, our data revealed a heretofore undocumented crossover interaction, in accordance with regulatory fit, which could disentangle past results: Specifically, we found promotion focus is associated with more cheating in a loss (vs. gain) frame, whereas prevention focus is associated with more cheating in a gain (vs. loss) frame. In gridiron football, this translates to offensive players fouling more when their team is losing (vs. winning) and defensive players fouling more when their team is winning (vs. losing).

Corruption is a global problem. Despite the importance of this theme, a shortage of theoretical models in both psychology and related areas that favor its understanding and investigation is noted. Due to this scarcity of theoretical models, in addition to the need to systematize studies on the topic, this theoretical article aims to describe the Analytical Model of Corruption (AMC) as an interdisciplinary and multilevel proposal aimed at corruption analysis. To achieve this goal, the concept of corruption was analyzed using related phenomena as reference. Similarities and differences in corruption have been identified with dishonest behavior and unethical behavior. Subsequently, theoretical models on corruption identified in the literature were presented, and their main characteristics and limitations were pointed out. After describing the models, the AMC was presented and its advantages over the previous models were discussed. Finally, it was concluded that the AMC could be configured as a theoretical model that guides interdisciplinary studies on corruption, allowing for a more complete analysis compared to previous theoretical models identified in the literature.

Although individuals have different kinds of defensive strategies towards identity threat, the relationship between identity threat and unethical behavior is still unclear. In the current study, according to identity threat and self-affirmation theory, we propose and test the role of publicness of identity threat in determining whether identity threat will lead to unethical behavior. One online experiment with 197 participants (mixed design) and one laboratory experiment with 86 participants (between-subject design) are used to test our hypotheses. Our findings reveal that when individuals' identity threat is from the public sphere, it will increase their unethical behavior, but when such a threat is from the private sphere, it will reduce their unethical behavior. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

U.S. Organizational Sentencing Guidelines provide firms with incentives to develop formal ethics programs to promote ethical organizational cultures and thereby decrease corporate offenses. Yet critics argue such programs are cosmetic. Here we studied bank employees before and after the introduction of formal ethics training—an important component of formal ethics programs—to examine the effects of training on ethical organizational culture. Two years after a single training session, we find sustained, positive effects on indicators of an ethical organizational culture (observed unethical behavior, intentions to behave ethically, perceptions of organizational efficacy in managing ethics, and the firm’s normative structure). While espoused organizational values also rose in importance post-training, the boost dissipated after the second year which suggests perceptions of values are not driving sustained behavioral improvements. This finding conflicts with past theory which asserts that enduring behavioral improvements arise from the inculcation of organizational values. Implications for future research are discussed.