Although Lippmann's The Good Society was written to address the crisis in liberal democracies in the 1930s, we argue that it offers a novel and plausible institutionalist account of the productivity slowdown and the increase in the experience of insecurity that has characterised most liberal democracies over the last 20–40 years. Central to Lippmann's account is a Smithian-institutionalist model of growth where property rights have to evolve both to encourage continued levels of risk taking in the face of new uncertainties and also to offset new sources of unequal bargaining power that the very process of growth itself creates. When property rights fossilise and fail to evolve, as in the 1930s and plausibly also now, productivity growth slows down, insecurity rises, and illiberal political creeds prosper. To avoid this, Lippmann's analysis suggests that property rights have to change to re-energise risk taking and to offset the new sources of unequal bargaining power. For example, in current circumstances, new ‘positive’ property rights arising from the development of social insurance might encourage risk taking and new ‘negative’ property rights in personal data might help offset the new sources of unequal bargaining power that have emerged.