A formal, decision-theoretic model of relationality is presented. Some elementary (game-theoretic) examples are provided that show how relationality can transform a social network into a collaborative community of other-regarding individuals. Early results from experimental economic games are provided that illustrate the models explanatory power. The model is compared, side-by-side, with Ostroms conceptualization of commons management as a repeated game with social sanctions.

In the real world, when people play games, they often receive advice from those that have played it before them. Such advice can facilitate the creation of a convention of behavior. This chapter studies the impact of advice on the behavior of subjects who engage in a non-overlapping generational ultimatum game where, after a subject plays, she is replaced by another subject to whom she can offer advice. Our results document the fact that allowing advice fosters the creation of a convention of behavior in ultimatum games. In addition, by reading the advice offered, we conclude that arguments of fairness are rarely used to justify the offers of senders but are relied upon to justify rejections by receivers.