This article studies how ‘cybercrime’ is framed under the pre-existing regional prohibition regimes and how it would be reshaped under the auspices of the UN. This article adopts a sociolegal approach by integrating transnational criminal law (TCL) and the conceptual framework of recursivity. Observations and analyses show that (i) only the Budapest Convention has institutional capacity to shape ‘cybercrime’, while state behaviour of framing ‘cybercrime’ is actually subject to human rights instruments; (ii) states reach an exceptional compromise in transforming ‘cybercrime’ at the global level during the negotiations under the UN; and (iii) protection from cybercrime is emerging as a common interest. This author proposes that the normative changes of framing ‘cybercrime’ reflect the competition of states for normative power on the international plane; therefore, a pursuit of a universalist formula for countering cybercrime would not succeed owing to a lack of a global commitment to what basic norms and rules govern state behaviour in cyberspace. Lastly, this author proposes that transnational criminalization of cybercrime should seek a minimum public order at the first place because it is premature to provide any real global regulation at this moment.