Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming increasingly important in our daily lives and so is academic research on its impact on various legal domains. One of the fields that has attracted much attention is extra-contractual or tort liability, as AI will inevitably cause damage. Reference can also be made to accidents involving autonomous vehicles. In this chapter, we will discuss some major and general challenges that arise in this context. We will thereby illustrate the remaining importance of national law to tackle these challenges and focus on procedural elements, including disclosure requirements and rebuttable presumptions. We will also illustrate how existing tort law concepts are being challenged by AI characteristics and provide an overview of regulatory answers.

The second phase in tort law develop relates to its reception of the society of organisations, which represents an evolution in the law's knowledge base by which large public and private organisations become central to knowledge generation and management. This is accompanied by the rise of expertise and insurance, and a break between expert knowledge and distributed experience as the knowledge base of society. This is patterned onto the law by the rise in 'vertical vicarious liability' or organisational liability, whatsoever its doctrinal nomenclature at the turn of the twentieth century. Calculable risk replaces fault as a key legal concept in the attribution of acts and omissions, and tort law is increasingly conceptualised as concerned with risk management against a background of the providential state. However, the model of organisational liability that develops remains a model of responsibility and should be characterised as a form of weak corrective justice or organisational moral responsibility. These changes have a profound impact on the law, which is documented by reference public and private liability in French, UK and German law, but reach their limits with the rise of network governance.

Chapter 9 includes some insights and observations from the Hon. Prof. Calabresi on the major elements of the Maimonidean theory, especially those that are similar – more or less – to contemporary tort law and economics. Calabresi discusses law, economics, and justice in our era and in Maimonides’ theory of torts, and empirical differences in the different times and their implications. Calabresi also considers the question of whether there are differences between the differential liability model presented by Maimonides, and contemporary theories of the economic analysis of tort law, expanding on deontological as opposed to utilitarian considerations according to law and economics. Calabresi deals specifically with the issue of punitive damages and discusses the innovative analysis of Maimonides compared to the multiplier approach, distributive justice as presented by Maimonides, and his optimal deterrence model. There is a great deal in Maimonides that presaged both his work in particular and sophisticated modern law and economics generally. Calabresi notes that not only can we now understand Maimonides, and the breadth of his thinking better, but we also have a clearer picture of the strengths and weaknesses of modern scholarship.

Chapter 7 attempts to define accurately the standard of care adopted by Maimonides in his Code with respect to four categories of damage: (1) damage caused by a person to the property of another, (2) damage caused by a person who injures another, (3) damage caused by property, and (4) murder. In relation to each of these four categories, Maimonides proposed a standard of care that lies on the scale between fault, negligence, and strict liability. A careful examination of Maimonides’ writings reveals that he favored different liability regimes for different categories of damage. We present a scheme that illustrates Maimonides’ differential model and explains its rationale with respect to the hierarchy in the different standards of care applied in different cases. We also describe the historical background, circumstances, and nature of the tortfeasors in Maimonides’ time and in the contemporary era. This is essential for an understanding of the differential liability model in itself and as compared to contemporary models. Maimonides’ tort theory, we argue, is based upon a fundamental distinction between two questions: (1) upon whom should tort liability be imposed and (2) what is the standard of care that should be imposed in each case.

After raising questions regarding the problematic texts in the Code in Chapter 2, and presenting consequentialist – and not only deontological – objectives of Maimonides’ tort theory as the two main objectives of tort law, as seen in Chapters 3–5, Chapter 6 revisits some of the problematic texts in the Code. In this chapter we revisit some of the problematic texts in the Code and attempted to cast light on them in view of the consequentialist objective of tort law elucidated in the Guide. In this way, we try to resolve some of the difficulties that were raised in Chapter 2. At the same time, we clearly show that the Guide and the Code do not always speak with one voice. Sometimes, a general rationalization offered in the Guide in relation to a particular ruling, such as that relating to the tam ox, cannot be reconciled with the details of the ruling as specified in the Code. Revisiting some problematic texts will serve as leverage for further understanding the Maimonidean theory in the .

Chapter 5 will examine consequentialist elements in Maimonides’ tort theory, based primarily on what he wrote in the Guide. We will see that although Maimonides’ theory is not consequentialist in the full sense of this term, several significant elements of consequentialism are found in his theory, notwithstanding the concurrent presence of other important elements. We also saw that Maimonides’ general approach to the objectives of tort law, mainly as emerges from the Guide, reveals an extremely important consequentialist objective – prevention of acts causing damage and deterrence. After a discussion of this important aspect of Maimonides’ tort theory, we will proceed to a comparative examination of the similarities and the differences between this theory and the modern theories of law and economics regarding torts, including the theories of some of the fathers of the economic analysis of law in general and of tort law in particular – Calabresi and Posner. We also present a certain proximity between the consequentialist approach of Maimonides and the modern approaches to punitive damages. We saw a certain similarity between his approach and the economic multiplier approach, but in our view, there is also similarity to the moral idea of societal redress in extracompensatory damages.

In Chapter 2 we will present the difficulties facing those who seek to understand Maimonides’ tort theory as it appears in the Code alone, and according to the common interpretation (the “yeshivah reading”). Several contemporary scholars, as well as rabbis from the Lithuanian yeshivot, identified a different element as an alternative to the element of peshiah, i.e., the element of ownership, and some say ownership and strict liability, by virtue of which liability is imposed for damage caused by a person’s property. We will examine this approach critically and conclude that it does not accurately reflect Maimonides’ position, for it raises serious difficulties, both conceptual-principled and exegetical. We will point to a trend of new explanations of the Jewish sources through the speculum of the common tort theories in the twentieth century in the world of Jewish law. Chapter 2 will leave us with many open questions, which will be answered in the subsequent chapters. The book contains three main parts: (a) Questions; (b) Answers; and (c) Dialogue. Chapter 2 presents the questions to be dealt with in the book. Chapters 3–6 supply answers, and Chapters 7–8 offer a dialogue between Maimonides and various contemporary tort theories.

Chapter 8 draws some cautious lessons from a contemporary analysis of torts for Maimonides’ theory of torts and vice versa. We offer a full conceptual description of the Maimonidean theory, based on the previous chapters, and also characterize Maimonides as a pluralistic-differential scholar. We show that, as opposed to contemporary approaches to torts, which emphasize law and economics and corrective justice, Maimonides’ approach should be characterized as pluralistic and not monistic. After showing how contemporary approaches shed light on Maimonides’ approach, we can move in the opposite direction; that is, we can draw some careful – but important – lessons from the Maimonidean theory for contemporary tort law. We suggest one possible way of learning lessons from Maimonides’ theory for contemporary law, which may help enrich the current tort law discourse. The argument that Maimonides is a true pluralist enables us to draw a careful comparison between Maimonidean and contemporary pluralistic approaches to tort law, such as those of Glanville Williams, Fleming James Jr., Izhak Englard, Gary Schwartz, Mark Geistfeld, Christopher Robinette, Steven Burton, John Goldberg, and Benjamin Zipursky. This comparison reveals differences among the approaches, as well as advantages and disadvantages of each approach.