Most critics of direct election of the president assume that it would require a runoff provision. Although it is possible that such a rule would encourage third-party candidacies, there is no need to institute a runoff under direct election of the president. Advocates of the electoral college are correct that America is better off without a second-ballot runoff election. They are incorrect, however, that the electoral college is the only way to avoid such a runoff. Although there is no voting system that guarantees that the most preferred candidate will win, both plurality election and ranked choice voting are more likely to produce the Condorcet winner than the electoral college. Neither system requires a second ballot. The electoral college is not essential for a two-party system and actually encourages third parties to run presidential candidates and discourages party competition in many states. There is no evidence that direct election of the president would polarize political parties. Similarly, there would be little incentive for secret deals under direct election and severe constraints on the bargains third parties could make. Moreover, there is much less chance of such deals under direct election than under the contingent election provision of the electoral college.

This chapter makes a general argument, equally applicable (mutatis mutandis) to the IOM as to the World Bank, or the World Health Organization or even the European University Institute. While it is arguable that the IOM has no strong humanitarian mission, this circumstance alone is unlikely to affect its legal accountability – the problems with accountability of international organizations under international law go much, much deeper. Legal accountability (not quite a term of art perhaps) is conceptualized as utilizing a (more or less) legal mechanism to test the acts of an international organizations against (more or less) legal standards. This may be done before a court, but may also involve internal accountability mechanisms. Those standards, in turn, do not simply comprise the entire corpus of international law, but are limited, it is generally agreed, to the treaties that international organizations are parties to, to international legal rules that have become internalized, and to the ‘general rules of international law’. There is consensus that this is an authoritative enumeration, but precious little agreement on what this entails

This chapter will examine three distinct issues. The first concerns agreements whereby the creditor or debtor to an existing contract is substituted by a new (third) party. Two types of substitution are envisaged, namely: assignment of rights (assignment) and assignment of debt (novation). The second focus of the chapter is on the effects of contracts on bona fide third parties and how the law mitigates any adverse impact. The third is an innovation of the Qatari CC, examining agreements the sole object of which is to attract third parties. This chapter will not deal with the rights of successors (heirs) to a contract following the death of the contracting party

This Chapter is concerned with the concept of consent in international arbitration, and in particular with the various forms that consent can take to accommodate contemporary business transactions. The focus of the Chapter is on non-signatories or third parties in international arbitration, namely parties who are implicated in the commercial side of the underlying transaction but are not formal parties to an arbitration agreement. The Chapter challenges the efficacy and coherence of the existing arbitration law in this area, and questions whether the traditional concept of consent for arbitration can be reconciled with complex commercial reality and non-signatory parties today.

This chapter investigates how scholars have previously challenged dyadic reductions and directly or indirectly embraced polylogue – often simply called “multiparty conversation” – as an alternative ontology for communication. The chapter is divided into two basic parts. First, the varied understandings of polylogue produced in the literature are discussed. This review reveals some key limitations of the extant literature on polylogues and clarifies terminological confusions. Second, drawing from a variety of relevant literature a nonexhaustive but compelling list of eleven polylogical facts instrumental to understanding what is at stake when people engage in polylogues is presented. These polylogical facts extend the framework by demonstrating both what is reduced in dyadic reductions of argumentation while the complex communicative phenomena that are at stake when people engage in polylogues.

This chapter contains a comprehensive, step-by-step analysis of the consultations phase in WTO dispute settlement. Then the chapter examines the practice and procedure used to establish a WTO panel and the composition of the panel. The chapter then analyzes the panel process step-by-step, including the organizational meeting, the working procedures, the written submissions to the panel, the hearings of the panel, the interim report, and the final report. The chapter also discusses the role of third parties and of the WTO Secretariat in the panel process.

While third states and international organisations often co-sign peace agreements in the capacity of witnesses or guarantors, little is understood of the legal consequences flowing from these roles. The chapter aims to fill this gap. First, it highlights that the mere designation of witness or guarantor leads to few consequences. Second, it analyses how specific third-party rights and obligations are established and conceptualised under VCLT rules, extended by analogy to intra-state peace agreements. Third, it provides a brief illustration of common third-party rights and obligations in peace agreements. Finally, it examines whether the involvement of third parties can internationalise an intra-state peace agreement, i.e. render it to be governed by international law. Bringing together views from the literature, jurisprudence and the preceding analysis on the structure of third-party rights and obligations, the chapter concludes that such rights and obligations can be internationalised, in a manner that can only extend to the agreement as a whole when inseparable from the rest of the agreement.

While third states and international organisations often co-sign peace agreements in the capacity of witnesses or guarantors, little is understood of the legal consequences flowing from these roles. The chapter aims to fill this gap. First, it highlights that the mere designation of witness or guarantor leads to few consequences. Second, it analyses how specific third-party rights and obligations are established and conceptualised under VCLT rules, extended by analogy to intra-state peace agreements. Third, it provides a brief illustration of common third-party rights and obligations in peace agreements. Finally, it examines whether the involvement of third parties can internationalise an intra-state peace agreement, i.e. render it to be governed by international law. Bringing together views from the literature, jurisprudence and the preceding analysis on the structure of third-party rights and obligations, the chapter concludes that such rights and obligations can be internationalised, in a manner that can only extend to the agreement as a whole when inseparable from the rest of the agreement.

Domestic and international arbitration in Poland is regulated by provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP), Part Five titled “Arbitration Court.”1 Part Five entered into force in October 2005 and modernized the Polish legal framework for arbitration. The CCP largely implement provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (UNCITRAL Model Law).2 There are, however, certain divergences that will be discussed in this chapter. Most recently, certain provisions of Part Five were amended in July 2019, with a view to promoting arbitration as a preferred means of dispute resolution.3

When it comes to electing the chief executive of the United States, the presidential debates play an important role in shaping public opinion and the choices facing voters. Having a fair process in place to determine who is eligible to participate in the debates and to guarantee that the debates are conducted neutrally is crucial to ensuring the integrity of the electoral process as a whole. In the past, controversies have arisen concerning which candidates should be invited to participate, which political parties should be represented, and whether the debates have been conducted in a way that is fair and neutral. Most of these controversies have never been resolved satisfactorily. Today, much more work needs to be done to ensure that our presidential primary and general election debates live up to their potential to provide truly diverse policy views to the public and are conducted in a manner that is wholly free from bias. Gender bias in terms of the questions asked of the candidates was evident in 2016, and other kinds of biases may appear in the future. Problematically, the eligibility rules for the general presidential debates have remained unchanged for decades. Meanwhile, government oversight of the debates remains virtually non-existent.