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The identification of early warning signs is of great importance for identifying individuals at risk for mental disorders. Especially in the case of bipolar disorder, these research endeavours are imperative considering that the frequently delayed diagnoses and longer illness duration are associated with symptom exacerbation and lower recovery rates.
Aims
To multimodally investigate associations between hypomanic personality traits and altered social affect and social cognition to probe their role as early warning signs of bipolar disorder.
Method
In a community sample (n = 140; 50.71% female), we investigated associations between hypomanic personality traits and both behavioural and neural activity measures of empathy and theory of mind (ToM) based on data from a functional magnetic resonance imaging paradigm.
Results
Although analyses revealed no significant associations between behavioural or neural correlates of empathy and hypomanic personality traits, these traits were significantly associated with elevated ToM-related neural activity in the anterior rostral medial prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex. These neural activation differences were not accompanied by differences in behavioural ToM performance, suggesting more intense recruitment of task-relevant brain regions but unaffected behavioural outcomes.
Conclusions
Our findings indicate hypomanic personality traits to be positively associated with ToM-related neural activity but not with behavioural ToM performance. Prospectively, our study contributes to driving towards a more comprehensive and potentially neurobiologically grounded phenotype of bipolar disorder risk that contributes to a more differential understanding of risk and resilience mechanisms.
We design a novel experiment to study how subjects update their beliefs about the beliefs of others. Three players receive sequential signals about an unknown state of the world. Player 1 reports her beliefs about the state; Player 2 simultaneously reports her beliefs about the beliefs of Player 1; Player 3 simultaneously reports her beliefs about the beliefs of Player 2. We say that beliefs exhibit higher-order learning if the beliefs of Player k about the beliefs of Player become more accurate as more signals are observed. We find that some of the predicted dynamics of higher-order beliefs are reflected in the data; in particular, higher-order beliefs are updated more slowly with private than public information. However, higher-order learning fails even after a large number of signals is observed. We argue that this result is driven by base-rate neglect, heterogeneity in updating processes, and subjects’ failure to correctly take learning rules of others into account.
The social environment and our social experiences provide a rich source for social theories about the behavior of others. Important prerequisites are social knowledge about who people are on an individual and group level and the ability to attribute the behavior of others to their mental states, often called mind reading, mentalizing, or theory of mind.
This chapter of the handbook discusses the complex, multifaceted connection between morality and religion from an evolutionary perspective. After providing some much-needed conceptual ground clearing, the authors focus on accounts of the linkage between morality and religion in terms of evolved psychological mechanisms that promote cooperation and inhibit competition. One of the better known of these accounts is the supernatural punishment hypothesis. On this view, the morality–religion link is sustained by the fact that belief in an all-knowing, all-powerful god who monitors people’s behavior and punishes their moral transgressions motivates people to behave less selfishly and more cooperatively. Another account emphasizes religious behavior and posits that participation in religious ritual is a form of costly signaling, indicating to others that the participant can be trusted to observe the moral norms of the community. While there is considerable support for the idea that aspects of religion function to curb selfishness, however, the authors caution that the psychological and sociological mechanisms underlying this function are not yet well understood.
My understanding of children’s cognitive development involved a series of progressive shifts in my understanding of what is involved in learning a language. Rather than language serving as a means of expressing and sharing existing thoughts, I came to see language as the exclusive means of creating thought itself. To my surprise I have become a sort of “Nominalist”; the view that language is the vehicle of thought itself.
I focus on how, for me, big questions such as, “How can we tell whether something is true?” were funneled by haphazard influences into specific interests. Classes on logic got me interested in the origins of concepts. Contact with Piaget’s theory of concept acquisition added a developmental dimension. Wondering about the meaning of words led to the problems of opaque contexts like belief reports. A brush with artificial intelligence made me focus on the distinction between implicit and explicit mental representations and consciousness. My thesis supervisor’s expertise in game theory led me to explore children’s perspective-taking. Work with Heinz Wimmer on the false belief task got me firmly entrenched in theory of mind research, focusing on simulation theory as its main opponent. And to get beyond documenting children’s flourishing achievements I turned to mental files theory to understand how perspectival thinking grows from our basic ability to think about objects.
Some developmental researchers plough a long, straight furrow. I can claim nothing so unwavering. I trace instead a career that has meandered, both geographically and intellectually, with successive forays into topics that have at best a subterranean connection to each other. In the Netherlands, I studied children’s developing understanding of different aspects of emotion, and more broadly their theory of mind. In England, I studied children’s imagination, including their pretending, role-play, reasoning, counterfactual thinking and emotional reactions to works of fiction. In the United States, I conducted studies on children’s willingness to trust testimony from informants who vary in their history of accuracy, their membership of particular groups and their levels of relevant expertise as well as studies of cross-cultural variation in the pattern of testimony that children receive – especially with respect to invisible or hard-to-observe phenomena in the domains of religion and science.
This chapter reviews research on social cognition and age. This covers self-focused processes, including self-referencing and memory as well as own-age bias and stereotype threat and stigma. Processes focused on other people are also reviewed, including moral judgment, empathy, theory of mind, social interactions and impression formation, memory for impressions, and trust.
Early learning of a second language at home has been found to be beneficial for children’s cognitive development, including their ability to ascribe mental states to others. We investigated whether second language learning in an educational setting can accelerate children’s sensitivity to a communication partner’s perspective and whether the amount of exposure to second language education makes a difference. We tested three groups of English monolingual four-five year old children with varying language exposure at the beginning of their first year at primary school and 24 weeks later. Children attending bilingual schools and children with weekly second language lessons exhibited similar accelerated development of communicative perspective-taking skills compared to children without second language provision. Such advances were not related to other cognitive advances. Thus, limited foreign language teaching might boost young children’s development in communicative perspective-taking skills, providing an enhanced basis for their social competence development.
The previous chapter considered the active role that readers play in the construction of meaning. It focused on the prior knowledge that readers bring to texts and which they use in the process of interpretation, and from this it becomes clear that the process of meaning creation is a result of the interconnection between textual triggers and reader’s world knowledge. Or, to restate this in Semino’s (1997) terms, texts project meaning while readers construct it. The means by which readers go about constructing meaning is, as explained in Chapter 5, the central concern of cognitive stylistics. This chapter continues the book’s consideration of this branch of stylistics by focusing on how readers navigate their way through texts. While Chapter 5 considered the stylistic effects that can arise as a result of textual features, for example deviant schemas or novel conceptual metaphors, this chapter’s focus is primarily on descriptive accounts of how readers process textual meaning. In so doing it outlines some of the most influential theories of text processing to have been adopted by stylistics.
In this paper, we propose a joint modeling approach to analyze dependency in parallel response data. We define two types of dependency: higher-level dependency and within-item conditional dependency. While higher-level dependency can be estimated with common latent variable modeling approaches, within-item conditional dependency is a unique kind of information that is often not captured with extant methods, despite its potential to shed new insights into the relationship between the two types of response data. We differentiate three ways of modeling within-item conditional dependency by conditioning on raw values, expected values, or residual values of the response data, which have different implications in terms of response processes. The proposed approach is illustrated with the example of analyzing parallel data on response accuracy and brain activations from a Theory of Mind assessment. The consequence of ignoring within-item conditional dependency is investigated with empirical and simulation studies in comparison to conventional dependency analysis that focuses exclusively on relationships between latent variables.
Theory of mind (ToM) is an essential social-cognitive ability to understand one’s own and other people’s mental states. Neural data as well as behavior data have been utilized in ToM research, but the two types of data have rarely been analyzed together, creating a large gap in the literature. In this paper, we propose and apply a novel joint modeling approach to analyze brain activations with two types of behavioral data, response times and response accuracy, obtained from a multi-item ToM assessment, with the intention to shed new light on the nature of the underlying process of ToM reasoning. Our trivariate data analysis suggested that different levels or kinds of processes might be involved during the ToM assessment, which seem to differ in terms of cognitive efficiency and sensitivity to ToM items and the correctness of item responses. Additional details on the trivariate data analysis results are provided with discussions on their implications for ToM research.
People often predict that they, and others, will be biased by sunk costs—they think that investing in an object or goal increases how much one values or wants it. In this article, we use sunk cost predictions to look at people’s theory of mind and their conceptions of mental life. More specifically, we ask which mental states and motivations are seen as underlying the bias. To investigate this, participants in two preregistered experiments predicted whether different kinds of agents would be biased by sunk costs, and also assessed the agents’ mental abilities. Participants predicted that some kinds of agents (e.g., human adults and children, robots) would show the sunk cost bias and that others would not (e.g., raccoons and human babies). These predictions were strongly related to the participants’ assessments of whether the different kinds of agents are capable of seeing actions as wasteful, but also related to their assessments of the agents’ capacities to feel regret and frustration.
Adult patients with the genetic disease neurofibromatosis type 1 (NF1) frequently report social difficulties. To date, however, only two studies have explored whether these difficulties are caused by social cognition deficits, and these yielded contradictory data. The aim of the present study was to exhaustively assess social cognition abilities (emotion, theory of mind, moral reasoning, and social information processing) in adults with NF1, compared with a control group, and to explore links between social cognition and disease characteristics (mode of inheritance, severity, and visibility).
Method:
We administered a social cognition battery to 20 adults with NF1 (mean age = 26.5 years, SD = 7.4) and 20 healthy adults matched for sociodemographic variables.
Results:
Patients scored significantly lower than controls on emotion, theory of mind, moral reasoning, and social information processing tasks. No effects of disease characteristics were found.
Conclusions:
These results appear to confirm that adults with NF1 have a social cognition weaknesses that could explain, at least in part, their social difficulties, although social abilities are not all impaired to the same extent. Regarding the impact of the disease characteristics, the patient sample seemed slightly insufficient for the power analyses performed. Thus, this exploratory study should form the basis of further research, with the objective of replicating these results with larger and more appropriately matched samples.
Previous studies have found deficits in imaginative elaboration and social inference to be associated with agenesis of the corpus callosum (ACC; Renteria-Vasquez et al., 2022; Turk et al., 2009). In the current study, Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) responses from a neurotypical control group and a group of individuals with ACC were used to further study the capacity for imaginative elaboration and story coherence.
Method:
Topic modeling was employed utilizing Latent Diritchlet Allocation to characterize the narrative responses to the pictures used in the TAT. A measure of the difference between models (perplexity) was used to compare the topics of the responses of individual participants to the common core model derived from the responses of the control group. Story coherence was tested using sentence-to-sentence Latent Semantic Analysis.
Results:
Group differences in perplexity were statistically significant overall, and for each card individually (p < .001). There were no differences between the groups in story coherence.
Conclusions:
TAT narratives from persons with ACC were normally coherent, but more conventional (i.e., more similar to the core text) compared to those of neurotypical controls. Individuals with ACC can make conventional social inferences about socially ambiguous stimuli, but are restricted in their imaginative elaborations, resulting in less topical variability (lower perplexity values) compared to neurotypical controls.
In this chapter, we explore the intricate relationship between early social interactions and the development of social cognition in humans. We address how imitation lays the foundation for subsequent social learning and how humans process information about themselves and others. Beginning with a discussion of our innate social nature, we emphasize the bidirectional influence of social and cognitive processes from birth, highlighting the pivotal role of social interaction in shaping childrens understanding of actions and interpersonal attention. Key topics covered include early biases supporting social cognition, such as contingency awareness and the progression toward understanding physical and psychological causation. The chapter also examines the development of mental state reasoning in individuals, exploring the significance of interest in faces, eyes, biological motion perception, and the differentiation between animate and inanimate objects. Finally, we discuss the impact of atypical social cognition in neurodevelopmental disorders like Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), exploring diagnostic and intervention techniques, contributing to a deeper understanding of the developmental underpinnings of social cognition in humans.
Recent decades have seen a revival of interest in the study of the self, self-awareness and various changes in self-awareness, especially in the context of mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia. This chapter outlines the psychopathology of various disturbances of awareness of self-activity, including depersonalisation, loss of emotional resonance, disturbances in the immediate awareness of self-unity, disturbances in the continuity of the self and disturbances of the boundaries of the self. It also explores theory of mind, consciousness and schizophrenia, which represent areas of growing research interest. The chapter concludes with suggested questions for eliciting specific symptoms in clinical practice, in addition to standard history-taking and mental state examination.
Children with Down syndrome (DS) show marked differences in their early development when compared to typically developing (TD) peers. Major domains of challenge include intellectual abilities, executive functioning, and structural language. Children with DS have a unique profile of strengths and weaknesses that must be considered when comparing them to TD children, especially in terms of Theory of Mind (ToM). ToM encompasses the developmental milestones reached early in childhood when children develop the ability to conceptualize and understand others' thoughts, emotions, perspectives, and intentions. In TD children, these abilities typically begin to mature around 4-6 years of age, while in children with DS, delays are observed relative to chronological age expectations. Evidence shows that children with DS have impaired ToM abilities; however, these deficits might be more related to underlying delays in structural language, rather than a fundamental misunderstanding of social cues. The present study seeks to fill gaps in the literature by using a nonverbal assessment (The Penny Hiding Game; PHG) to evaluate a) ToM abilities in children with DS relative to younger TD peers of a similar mental ability level and b) relationships between ToM performance and structural language skills.
Participants and Methods:
25 children with DS (60% F, M=11.39 years) and 25 TD children (40% F, M = 5.37, range = 3 to 7) participated. Participants' structural language abilities were briefly assessed using the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test- III Listening Comprehension Test (Oral Discourse Comprehension subcomponent). ToM was assessed using the PHG.
Results:
Univariate analysis of covariance was used to explore differences in ToM performance between groups while controlling for mental ability level. Children with DS (M= 2.79, SD= 2.23) performed significantly worse than TD peers (M= 4.28, SD= 1.87) on the ToM task (F(1, 60)= 4.5, p= .038). Linear regression was used to assess associations between ToM and structural language abilities. When both groups were lumped together, there was a modest association between ToM and Listening Comprehension scores (R2 = .12, F (1, 55) = 7.29, p= .009). However, when groups were considered separately, significant associations were not observed (p>.1).
Conclusions:
The DS group showed markedly diminished ToM performance compared to TD controls, as expected based on the literature. However, data did not suggest a clear association between ToM and structural language skills. While an association was observed when groups were lumped, this relationship was likely driven by group differences in both ToM and structural language skills. Future research should examine the relationship between ToM performance, different aspects of language functioning, and the cooccurrence of autistic traits among children with DS in order to augment our understanding of linguistic and social correlates of ToM performance in young children with DS.
Multiple sclerosis (MS) is a persistent neuroinflammatory disease of the central nervous system that affects young adults, and is pathologically characterized by multiple and distributed focal white matter lesions, although they are characteristically located in periventricular regions. Cognitive impairment occurs in all clinical forms of the disease, with great variability and great impact on the quality of life of patients. Recent research indicates that in addition to cognitive and physical deficits, they also have deficits in social cognition, such as Theory of Mind. Although social cognition in patients with multiple sclerosis has begun to be studied in recent years, there is still little knowledge about its impact in the early stages of the disease, when the load of injuries is low and physical disability is not yet present. A series of 7 cases of patients diagnosed with MS in follow-up by the Multiple Sclerosis polyclinic of the Institute of Neurology of the Hospital de Clínicas is presented.
Participants and Methods:
Clinically stable patients with no recent urges and no cognitive complaint were included. They were evaluated with the ACE-R screening test and Theory of Mind tests: Reading the mind in the eyes and Faux Pas tests.
Results:
All patients presented normal ACE results, without indicators of cognitive impairment and poor performance in the emotion reading test. In two cases, poor yields in Faux Pas were also found.
Conclusions:
Social cognition has a great impact on quality of life, and there are indicators of involvement in early stages of the disease in which other typical cognitive deficits are not yet evident, and may constitute the first indicator of deterioration. The evaluation and early detection of deficits in social cognition could contribute to the treatment and quality of life of patients.
Theory of mind (ToM) deficits have been reported in patients with multiple sclerosis (pwMS). However, most studies have used pictures or written scenarios as stimuli without distinguishing between cognitive and affective ToM, and no studies have investigated older pwMS. The aims of this study were to determine the impact of MS and age on cognitive and affective ToM using a more ecological video-based task. We also aimed to investigate the relationships between ToM, cognition and emotion reading to understand the nature of ToM deficits in pwMS.
Participants and Methods:
We recruited 13 young healthy controls (HC), 14 young pwMS, 14 elderly HC and 15 elderly pwMS. ToM was measured using an adaptation of the Conversations and Insinuations task (Ouellet et al. 2010). In this task, participants watch four 2-minutes videos of social interactions, which are interrupted by multiple choice questions about either the emotional state (affective ToM; 14 questions) or the intention (cognitive ToM; 14 questions) of the characters. They also underwent a short neuropsychological battery including cognitive tasks (Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA), DKEFS Color-Word Interference Test) and an experimental multimodal emotion recognition task.
Results:
We found significant effects of group (pwMS < HC), age (older < younger) and condition (cognitive ToM < affective ToM) on the ToM task. Although no interaction effect was found, the elderly pwMS group showed the largest discrepancy between their cognitive and affective ToM, the cognitive subtask being significantly more affected. ToM significantly correlated with general cognition (MoCA) in all participants, while cognitive inhibition (DKEFS Color-Word Interference Test) correlated with ToM only in elderly pwMS. No significant correlation was observed between ToM and emotion reading.
Conclusions:
This study highlights both cognitive and affective ToM deficits in pwMS, and particularly in cognitive ToM in elderly pwMS. These impairments could be underlied by cognitive and executive difficulties, but not by core social cognitive impairments, as observed in the correlation analyses. Future studies should investigate the relationships between ToM impairments and impairments in real-life empathy and social behavior in pwMS.