During the 1970s, governments increasingly expressed concerns about the loss of revenue through the use of tax havens by both individuals and corporations. This article explores a covert international working group (the Group of Four) set up between France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States in 1969 in response to such concerns. At regular meetings, officials exchanged information gathered by their respective tax authorities in auditing multinational companies. In the 1980s, under increasing pressure from governments in a now much more hostile climate to tax authorities, the Group’s work shifted away from multinationals and toward more general, technical questions. The history of the Group of Four illustrates the importance of the 1960s and 1970s as a period for regulating economic actors and the impact of broader circumstances on the success or failure of anti-tax avoidance measures.

This paper reviews work that tests (1) how formal and informal institutions, and especially their interaction, affect participation in the shadow economy in transition countries; and (2) how participating in these shadow economies affects individuals' well-being. The key findings are that a clash of individuals' perceptions of formal institutions with their informal institutions increases involvement in the shadow economy. Conversely, a trustworthy relationship with the government and other individuals makes people more inclined to comply. The importance of their social and institutional context also appears in how individuals' involvement in the shadow economy relates to their well-being. These findings complement insights from the rich literature on tax morale, on the exchange between public institutions and citizens and between culture and institutions more generally. The findings also contribute to the institutional economic literature by empirically showing that: (1) focusing on formal institutions alone, that is strengthening the rule of law, is a necessary but insufficient response to the shadow economy; (2) taking informal institutions, such as individuals' trust and tax morale, into account is of equal importance; and (3) most importantly, formal and informal institutions go hand in hand, and their interaction should be an essential part of the new institutional perspective.

Tax evasion can be considered as a systemic fraud in which different parties such as taxpayers, lawyers, banks, and multinational entities interact. Here, accountants are key agents owing to their legal liability in tax reporting and their knowledge on accounting rules. The present study analyzes the role that accountants play in firms tax evasion by presenting evidence from a randomized field experiment carried out with microenterprises in Ecuador’s tax system in early 2016. The article evaluates to what extent a notification of accountants is more effective in increasing tax reporting than a notification of taxpayers, through five different treatments. The results show that simultaneous persuasive notifications of both accountants and taxpayers were the unique treatment that significantly increased firms’ declared income tax. Furthermore, it was shown that penalty notifications of accountants, rather than taxpayers only, were the most significant treatment at reducing revenue underreporting.

We explore how tax evasion by firms affects the growth- and welfare-maximizing rates of corporate income tax (CIT) in an endogenous growth model with productive public service. We show that the negative effect of CIT on growth is mitigated in the presence of tax evasion. This increases the benefit of raising the CIT rate for public service provision. Thus, in contrast to Barro [(1990) Journal of Political Economy 98, 103–125], the optimal tax rate is higher than the output elasticity of public service. Through numerical exercises, we demonstrate that the role of tax evasion by firms is quantitatively significant.

Identifying taxpayers who engage in noncompliant behaviour is crucial for tax authorities to determine appropriate taxation schemes. However, because taxpayers have an incentive to conceal their true income, it is difficult for tax authorities to uncover such behaviour (social desirability bias). Our study mitigates the bias in responses to sensitive questions by employing the list experiment technique, which allows us to identify the characteristics of taxpayers who engage in tax evasion. Using a dataset obtained from a tax office in Jakarta, Indonesia, we conducted a computer-assisted telephone interviewing survey in 2019. Our results revealed that 13% of the taxpayers, old, male, corporate employees, and members of a certain ethnic group had reported lower income than their true income on their tax returns. These findings suggest that our research design can be a useful tool for understanding tax evasion and for developing effective taxation schemes that promote tax compliance.

This article explores whether income underreporting for tax purposes can explain why the majority of U.S. farmers earn low or negative net farm income. Using 10 years of U.S. Department of Agriculture farm-level data, the extent of underreporting is estimated by exploiting the fact that farm households face an incentive to underreport farm income that varies with their reported off-farm income. Results indicate that 39% of total farm income is underreported. For large farms, the results imply a substantial discrepancy between reported and earned farm income. For small-scale operations, underreporting reduces but does not eliminate the gap between farm and off-farm wages.

This paper deals with the optimal management of the public debt-to-GDP ratio. We specifically focus on a contrasting tax evasion-based strategy for controlling the debt-to-GDP ratio. Two devices can be employed by the policymaker: by the one side, the tax rate is to be applied to the tax payers; by the other side, the monitoring activity is to be performed in order to detect the evaded taxes. To pursue our scopes, a stochastic control problem is developed and solved. Some numerical experiments validate the theoretical proposal and lead to an intuitive discussion of the obtained findings.

We assess the European Union’s (EU) most significant international tax policy. The 2005 Tax and Savings Directive obliges cooperating jurisdictions to withhold tax or report on interest income earned by entities whose beneficial owner is an EU resident. As the Directive applies only to beneficial ownership in cooperative jurisdictions, it can be circumvented by transferring ownership to a non-EU resident or company or by transferring the entity to a non-cooperative jurisdiction. Using a database on individual offshore entities leaked from two firms in 2013, we compare the response of EU-owned entities with a control group of non-EU-owned entities. We show that the growth of EU-owned entities declined immediately after the Directive’s implementation, whereas that of non-EU-owned entities remained stable. We observe the substitution of EU ownership for non-EU ownership, as well as the substitution of cooperative for non-cooperative offshore jurisdictions. This calls for anti-evasion policies that are broader in scope and scale.

Can governments increase tax compliance by rewarding honest taxpayers? We conducted a controlled laboratory experiment comparing tax compliance under a “deterrence” baseline with tax compliance under two “reward” treatments: a “donation” treatment giving taxpayers a say in the spending purposes of their payments and a “lucky” treatment giving taxpayers the (highly unlikely) chance of winning a lottery. The reward treatments significantly affected tax behaviour but not in a straightforward manner. Although female participants altered their behaviour as expected and complied somewhat more, men strongly reacted in the opposite manner: they evaded a much higher percentage of taxes than under the baseline. Apparently, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to boost tax compliance.

I develop a dynamic political economy model with an informal sector and two political parties alternating in office. In equilibrium, if the incumbent political party faces a higher probability of staying in office, it sets a higher tax rate on the formal economy to invest more in productive public capital, while spending less for current office rent. Moreover, I argue that public capital is mainly utilized by the formal sector, and this implies that countries in which incumbent parties are more likely to stay in power have a higher tax burden but a smaller informal sector. I also present some empirical evidence that supports the main results of the model.

This paper explores the consequences of tax enforcement policies for monetary policy. Agents may evade taxes by working in the informal sector, but they are detected with positive probability. Workers are rewarded with government benefits that are proportional to formal (taxed) work. When enforcement is imperfect and collecting taxes is costly, the optimal inflation rate is positive and inflation becomes a second-best tax. Deviations from the Friedman rule are optimal and depend on the tax enforcement policies. Using U.S. data, we compute the quantitative effect of different tax structures on inflation and interest rate. We show that different tax enforcement and government spending (benefits) policies induce different optimal outcomes for inflation and interest rates.