The sentencing guidelines for the sliding scale of sentence discounts in both England and Wales and Hong Kong have provided for judicial discretion to depart from the recommended sentence reductions. This chapter investigates the consistency of applying the sentencing guidelines in the two jurisdictions. It is found that in general, both English and Hong Kong courts adhere to the recommended guidelines. Multivariate analyses, however, using the sentence discount as the outcome reveal gender and confession to be significant factors for departing from guidelines, with female defendants and defendants who have confessed given a higher sentence discount. Moreover, when reviewing the sentencing process, inconsistencies occur when judges apply aggravating and mitigating factors, as well as the sentence discount for guilty pleas, which may lead to inconsistencies in sentence outcomes.

This chapter discusses the adoption, and rejection, of a quantified sliding scale of sentence in comparable legal jurisdictions. The chapter begins with England and Wales, where the sliding scale of sentence discounts was first standardised. It then looks at Hong Kong, where its sliding scale of sentence discounts was a judicial creation of the appellate court that took inspiration from the developments in England and Wales. Afterwards, this chapter examines certain Australian states that have moved towards a quantified sliding scale of sentence discounts. It then discusses the two jurisdictions of Scotland and New Zealand, which have rejected the quantified sliding scale of sentence discounts in favour of greater judicial discretion. It is shown that despite the varying responses to whether quantified guidelines for sentence discounts for guilty pleas should be implemented, all the jurisdictions surveyed agree that earlier guilty pleas should generally attract higher sentence discounts, primarily justified based on the perceived utilitarian benefits of early guilty pleas.

Existing literature points to guilty pleas leading to plea-trial disparity in sentences, with scholars referring to this as a ‘trial penalty’ or a ‘trial/jury tax’, while courts and policymakers use the terms ‘sentence discounts’ or ‘sentence reductions’. This chapter argues that plea trial and plea-timing disparities have negative consequences for the justice system, as well as that the sentence disparity should be conceptualised as a trial and late-plea penalty. Using the datasets from the Crown Court Sentencing Survey (CCSS) and the Hong Kong District Court compiled for this study, this chapter investigates the effects that the timing of guilty pleas may have on sentence outcomes. Interestingly, a late-plea penalty was found for England and Wales, whereas only a trial penalty was found for Hong Kong. The chapter concludes by discussing the implications of these results.

Remedies in the criminal process are the most frequently awarded remedies. Part I outlines existing practices in international and select domestic courts. International criminal courts have more experience using alternatives to stays of proceedings or exclusion of evidence by awarding sentence reductions or damage awards, including for crime victims. Domestic courts often balance competing interests before ordering stays or excluding evidence but often not in a transparent or disciplined manner. Part II suggests that rather than relying on vague concepts of judicial integrity, courts should require the state to justify restrictions on remedies through proportionality reasoning. This should be based on legitimate state objectives, not including the seriousness of the offence charged but that does include the seriousness of the violation. Part III applies the two-track approach and argues that courts, subject to proportionality constraints, should focus on compensating for violations. This make sense of individualistic standing and causation requirements. Individual and systemic tracks are not watertight compartments. The court should consider whether the state has responded reasonably to the violation, including with respect to police training and discipline. Domestic courts should be more attentive to repetitive violations and the need to respond with cycles of individual and systemic remedies.