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1 results

  • 12 - Regulatory Structure and the Revolving Door Phenomenon in South Korea

  • from Part III - Different Topographies
  • Edited by Andrew Godwin, Andrew Schmulow
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Twin Peaks Financial Regulation
    Published online:
    24 June 2021
    Print publication:
    15 July 2021, pp 215-235

  • Summary

    For almost a decade, South Korea has failed in its quest to scale the ‘Twin Peaks’. Every presidential election cycle and congressional term has produced numerous proposals to reform the Korean financial regulatory architecture, along the lines of the Twin Peaks model. This chapter first outlines the 2011 savings bank crisis, and the subsequent botched architectural reforms, with a focus on the proposed Twin Peaks approach in Korea. It then examines the risks of the revolving door phenomenon in general, and specifically in the context of the 2011 savings bank crisis. A brief description and analysis of Korea’s anti-revolving door provisions, and revisions introduced in 2011, follows. Finally, the chapter analyses the implications of the revolving door phenomenon for the Twin Peaks regulatory architecture.