The difference in the relative bargaining power of musicians and their corporate partners not only has consequences for the negotiation and formation phase of the contract, but also for its performance, consisting of the exploitation of protected content and the ensuing remuneration. Unfair situations may arise in both respects. This chapter analyses to what extent the legal framework intervenes – and should intervene. First, it reviews exploitation obligations, both in terms of the existence and scope of a duty to exploit and the possible limitations to the content of exploitation activities. Subsequently, the requirement of ‘fair’ remuneration, the available tools for ex post contract adjustment and legislative measures seeking to enhance transparency in the music value chain are scrutinised. The chapter then moves on the performance stage of contracts in secondary relationships, before making a case for a harmonised residual remuneration right for digital exploitation, and concluding.

Both corporate partners and musicians may have valid reasons for wanting to terminate a contract. Forcing them to uphold the contract curbs party agency. Relevant reasons may include the aim of avoiding undue investment in an artist who has proven to be commercially unviable, the wish to escape unfair situations in terms of rights transfer, or cases of (perceived) unfairness in terms of exploitation and/or remuneration. The excessive duration of a contract may in itself also give rise to problems. On a more general level, the exclusive nature of many music industry contracts sits uneasily with the vision of musicians as independent, creative actors. This chapter reviews how the selected substantive legal regimes affect parties’ possibility to terminate the contractual relationship. First, the chapter reviews potentially applicable limitations on contract duration, as well as grounds for termination on the basis of breach of contract. Taking a more practical view, the consequences of contract termination are then assessed in order to gauge whether these consequences may amount to switching costs that prevent the termination of contracts in practice.