On average, childless women observed by the Panel Study of Income Dynamics report that they intend to have more children than they actually have. A collection of intentions that record only whether respondents intend to have another child can more accurately predict the number of children they have. Errors in the formation of intentions are not required to explain this finding. Rather, if intentions record a survey respondent's most likely predicted number of children, then the average of these intentions does not necessarily equal average actual fertility, even if intentions are formed using rational expectations.

While the last few decades of political economic history give the impression that the logic of neoliberalism is inexorable, this article argues that once we look further backwards and dig into recently declassified archives documenting the early days of neoliberal theory and practice, we find a messier picture. Economic policymakers in Thatcher and Reagan's administrations in the early 1980s did not set out to ‘fail forwards’ by generating a crisis that would enable a statist kind of neoliberalism. The key ideas that they drew on and the policies that they used to put them into practice sought to transform the economy indirectly, through a set of performative policy devices that they believed would generate a dramatic shift in people's inflationary expectations, lowering inflation without provoking a major recession. Archival records make it clear that these efforts were not only a failure, but also one that policymakers were acutely aware of at the time. By examining these quiet failures in economic policy, we can better understand how these governments simultaneously failed in their early efforts to introduce neoliberal economics and yet ultimately succeeded in transforming their economies in important respects – and in legitimising those transformations by narrating failure as a kind of inevitable success.

This paper charts the evolution of mainly empirical research at the NIESR over the 1970s and 80s. As was all too evident there were very large discrete technical improvements in data handling and manipulation over this period. Less well appreciated were the effects on the economy of major supply-side shocks coming from the World economy leading to ‘Stagflation’ and, interconnected but somewhat later, in the UK, marked changes in macro policy regime. This latter was strongly influenced by the seminal papers of Lucas (1976) and Sims (1980); both highly critical of the then current practices in macroeconomics, though each having very different intellectual stances. The response in the NIESR was to engage at an early stage in these innovations; applying the mantra that an informed criticism was more efficient than an uninformed one. During this period it became a leader in the econometrics of applied macro modelling under different expectations assumptions, including the rational expectations hypothesis (REH). Throughout, it remained critical of the anti-empirical drift encouraged in the Lucas Critique, criticism borne out more recently by the financial instability of the 1990s and the crisis that followed.

This paper examines the stability of sunspot equilibria in one-sector RBC models under infinite horizon learning. We present general conditions under which the reduced-form model can possess E-stable sunspot equilibria and apply these conditions to three prominent one-sector RBC models. We find that the rational expectations sunspot equilibria are generally unstable under learning.

This paper tests the ability of New Keynesian models to match the data regarding a key channel for monetary transmission: the dynamic interactions between macroeconomic variables and their corresponding expectations. We exploit survey expectations data and adopt a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)-VAR approach to assess the extent and sources of model misspecification. The results point to serious misspecification in the expectations-formation side of the DSGE model. The rational expectations hypothesis is primarily responsible for the model's failure to capture the co-movements between observed macroeconomic expectations and realizations. Alternative models of expectations formation help partially reconcile the New Keynesian model with the data.

The general method of moments procedure is used for estimating a soybean acreage response function assuming that producers hold rational expectations. Results indicate that soybean, corn, and wheat futures prices, lagged acreage, and government programs are significant factors for determining soybean plantings. Implications of the results are that crop acreage selection by Georgia producers is not very responsive to demand shocks. Thus, producers in other regions are more likely to absorb impacts from these shocks on crop acreage selection.

Risk has long been recognized as potentially important in determining agricultural supply. However, supply response models have either incorporated risk in an ad hoc manner or not at all. A rational expectations supply response model incorporating price risk is developed, an estimation procedure suggested, and an empirical example presented.

We explore real-time adaptive nonlinear learning dynamics in stochastic macroeconomic systems. Rather than linearizing nonlinear Euler equations where expectations play a role around a steady state, we instead approximate the nonlinear expected values using the method of parameterized expectations. Further, we assume that these approximated expectations are updated in real time as new data become available. We argue that this method of real-time parameterized expectations learning provides a plausible alternative to real-time adaptive learning dynamics under linearized versions of the same nonlinear system, and we provide a comparison of the two approaches.

Evolutionary game theory provides a fresh perspective on the prospect that agents with heterogeneous expectations might eventually come to agree on a single expectation corresponding to the efficient markets hypothesis. We establish conditions under which agreement on a unique forecast is stable, but also show that persistent heterogeneous expectations can arise if those conditions do not hold. The critical element is the degree of curvature in the payoff weighting functions agents use to value forecasting performance. We illustrate our results in the context of an asset pricing model where a martingale solution competes with the fundamental solution for agents' attention.

The transcript of a panel discussion marking the 50th anniversary of John Muth's “Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements” (Econometrica 1961). The panel consisted of Michael Lovell, Robert Lucas, Dale Mortensen, Robert Shiller, and Neil Wallace. The discussion was moderated by Kevin Hoover and Warren Young. The panel touched on a wide variety of issues related to the rational-expectations hypothesis, including its history, starting with Muth's work at Carnegie Tech; its methodological role; applications to policy; its relationship to behavioral economics; its role in the recent financial crisis; and its likely future.

The panel discussion was held in a session sponsored by the History of Economics Society at the Allied Social Sciences Association (ASSA) meetings in the Capitol 1 Room of the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Denver, Colorado.

Political campaigns are dynamic struggles between candidates to define the informational context for voters. Although much research describes how campaigns unfold or explores their effects on voters, less attention has been given to developing and testing a dynamic theory of candidate interaction during campaigns. In this study, the authors examine three different theories of candidate behavior, testing each using data on the TV advertisements aired in 23 gubernatorial elections held in 2002. The analysis examines both the total advertising efforts and the total negative advertising efforts of candidates in these races, differentiating between candidates based on partisanship, incumbency status, and whether they won or lost. The authors find support for all three theories, demonstrating their complementary nature and the value of analyzing campaigns as dynamic processes.

Roger Guesnerie is a prominent economic theorist. Among his many honors and distinctions, he is a Foreign Member of the American Academy of Arts and Science and an Honorary Foreign Member of the American Economic Association; he has been a President of the European Economic Association and of the Econometric Society. Currently a Professor at the College de France, he has made fundamental contributions to second-best theory and public economics, information economics, and rational expectation theory.

Guesnerie was one of the founding fathers of second-best theory. His contributions to public economics, addressing issues such as nonconvex economies and especially taxation in a second-best context, remain absolute references on these topics; more recently, he has provided an in-depth analysis of issues related to climate change and global warming from a public economics perspective. Regarding contract theory, his work with Jean Jacques Laffont has considerably extended our understanding of the properties of the basic models, as well as the set of tools that economists can use to address these problems. Finally, Guesnerie's work has been influential in the critical reassessment of rational expectation theory that took place over the last decades. On one hand, he has been a prominent figure in the development of so-called “sunspot” models, which reconcile the Keynesian notion of “animal spirits” with the formal requirements of rational expectations. On the other hand, he has provided path-breaking discussions of the theoretical relevance of rational expectation theory, based on a detailed assessment of the coordination between individual expectations that is implicit in the concept. In some classes of models, Guesnerie argues, rational expectation equilibria constitute a natural outcome, because coordination can be achieved either through “eductive” reasoning (for which common knowledge of individual rationality is sufficient) or as the product of simple evolutionary or learning dynamics (and in general in both ways). In other cases, however, such arguments do not appear to support the rational expectations solution, and its relevance is therefore much less obvious. On a more institutional side, Guesnerie has created the doctoral program “Analyse et Politique Economique” at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales; besides this program, in 1989, several related research centers in Paris merged into Delta, which Guesnerie chaired between 1992 and 2000, and then into the Paris School of Economics (PSE), at which Guesnerie is Chairman of the Board.

This interview with Roger Guesnerie gives an opportunity to discuss further the current situation of economic theory and economics in general, as well as to compare the European and American traditions in economics.