Before the 20th century, most rules of international law were in the form of customary international law. Since then, the increased complexity of international relations and rapid international development have led to a substantial growth in the number and diversity of treaties. Article 38(1)(a) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ Statute’) recognises treaties as a (material) source of international law by referring to ‘international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states’. Treaties now regulate trade, communications, environmental protection, military cooperation and defence, and human rights, to name but a few of the myriad topics. International environmental law, for example, is almost entirely governed by treaties, and international trade, investment and communications ‘are unimaginable without treaties’. The main rules in the law of treaties are contained in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’), which governs treaty relations between states and is the focus of this chapter.

This chapter examines how a state becomes a party to a treaty, including signature, initialling and ratification, where applicable. Whether a state can participate in a multilateral treaty depends on the terms of the treaty. The practice of the Council of Europe is examined. Signature may express consent to be bound but often signature will be subject to ratification. Ratification is the international act whereby a state establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound. It is to be distinguished from the domestic process which enables a state to ratify. Advice is given on the form and content of an instrument of ratification. A state may also consent to be bound by acceptance, approval or accession. Accession is primarily the means by which a state may become a party if it is unable to sign the treaty. The chapter also examines rights and obligations prior to entry into force, the possibility of withdrawing consent to be bound, and the ways in which treaties might be developed.

One key feature of the Constitution – the concept of federalism – was unclear when it was introduced, and threatened the Constitution’s ratification by those who feared the new government would undermine state sovereignty. In their famous essays in The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison defended the Constitution and argued that state legislatures would sound the alarm if the national government exceeded its authority. They argued that through interposition state legislatures would effectively check the national government by mobilizing resistance should the government try to overreach. Resolutions passed by legislators could legitimately be considered an expression of the people that could then be shared with the state’s congressional delegation and other state legislatures. Hamilton’s and Madison’s advocacy for state legislatures as monitors of the equilibrium of the two levels of government under the Constitution was a rhetorical argument designed to address the objections of Anti-Federalists. At the time of the ratification debates, both men were deeply distrustful of state legislatures, yet needed to explain how the national government would not overwhelm the states.

Scholars often point to pressure from the United States as a key factor in driving membership in the nuclear nonproliferation regime, but this explanation has trouble explaining the changes we see in patterns of membership over time. This chapter shows that variation in the perceived effectiveness of the regime – as indicated by overall membership, the strength of verification measures, the effectiveness of enforcement, and a history of cooperation – better explains why states join. Member states are reluctant to forgo nuclear weapons without assurances that others will comply as well, and signals of regime effectiveness reassure states that their commitments will be reciprocated. This argument runs counter to the conventional wisdom among international organizations scholars, that there is a “depth versus breadth” tradeoff in institutional design. Drawing from archival documents, this chapter discusses the illustrative cases of the NPT ratification decision in Australia and Switzerland. It then tests its theory using data on state membership in the NPT.

Equity closely scrutinises relationships in which one party places trust and confidence in another. There are many examples of trust in human interaction, but equity cannot grant relief against every breach of trust and confidence, any more than contract law can enforce all promises. Only some trusting relationships and some obligations of confidence are protected. The relationships which equity protects are known as ‘fiduciary relationships’. A relationship of trust and confidence will be recognised as fiduciary where it arises from F (fiduciary) undertaking to act in the interests of B (beneficiary) in a matter which confers a discretion on F, and in respect of which the exercise of discretion affects B’s economic interests. B may hand over property to F, such as an investor handing over money to an investment adviser. A settlor may hand property to F to hold on trust for B. Alternatively, B may entrust F with the task of negotiating a contract on behalf of B so that F is B’s agent. Or F may be entrusted with the task of obtaining information on behalf of B which will enable B to exploit a commercial opportunity. This is also an example of agency.

Expressly political literature in the period of the Revolution and early republic attempts to balance, synthesize, or overcome the contradiction between the language of universal freedom and the nascent and evolving national institutions of domination, exploitation, and general unfreedom. In the early republic’s modern, specifically capitalist form of national law, the literary vehicle is inseparable from the emergent institutional form, and this essay argues that the early republic thus initiates a considerably new phase in the nexus of rhetorical expression and social power. Through readings of the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution, and key texts from the ratification debate, the essay traces the invention of a state machinery uniquely suited not primarily to overt domination over citizen-subjects, but rather to their exploitation by private actors formally extrinsic to the state – an apparatus writ small, in the grammar, syntax, and distinctive diction of the primary political texts.

This chapter focuses on the rules set out in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The chapter begins with the concept of a treaty, before discussing treatymaking, with a particular focus on the conclusion of treaties, their entry into force, and reservations to treaties. The chapter then delves into how treaties operate -- namely, their scope of application and their interpretation. Finally, this chapter looks at the invalidity, suspension, and termination of treaties.

This chapter focuses on the rules set out in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The chapter begins with the concept of a treaty, before discussing treatymaking, with a particular focus on the conclusion of treaties, their entry into force, and reservations to treaties. The chapter then delves into how treaties operate -- namely, their scope of application and their interpretation. Finally, this chapter looks at the invalidity, suspension, and termination of treaties.

International law depends on foreign relations law not only to establish the means by which states can consent to treaty obligations, but also the means to fulfill any resulting obligations, including by incorporating treaties into domestic law. Given that, the professed indifference of international law towards it—as toward other forms of domestic law—is puzzling. It is also misleading. As is widely evident, international affairs create an opportunity for certain domestic actors, usually executives, to assume additional authority. Less obviously, international law, reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), actually influences foreign relations law relating to the creation and elimination of international treaty obligations – encouraging even those states that possess other constitutional agents to regard executive power as sufficient. The homogenizing effects of particular international law rules is an important complement to the study of comparative foreign relations law.

In this chapter, I review the international relation and international law literature on treaty commitment and treaty compliance highlighting the prominent arguments and findings. In doing so, I unpack the implications of the dominant and central focus on ratification. In this critical review, I recognize the many contributions of existing research and focus on how prominent studies conceptualized and operationalized "commitment" and "ratification." I argue that expanding these concepts will widen and deepen our understanding of the role international human rights plays.

In this chapter, I introduce the central claim of the manuscript – that the different types of treaty commitment need to be analyzed and considered as distinct when generating expectations of human rights behavior. The legal paths that states take concerning commitment to human rights treaties are consequential for how they engage with the law and human rights behavior. The chapter devotes attention to fine descriptive data analytics demonstrating a variety of differences across the four commitment actions.

This chapter considers rules applicable in the UK to shareholders exercising power in their own interests, rather than the interests of the company, and asks whether these create any problems for private equity investors, in theory and in practice.It also looks at other ways in which shareholders and directors can be held liable for the actions of their companies, including Bribery Act rules, health and safety laws, competition law rules and tortious liability.

This chapter begins by introducing the concept of corporate governance, and the regulatory role of directors’ duties. An appreciation of corporate governance methodologies gives context to the ‘hard law’ of directors’ duties. The chapter then considers who falls within the definition of director, the role of the director within the company, and how that role attracts legal and non-legal regulation.

Within the last decade, the Supreme Court has made two telling observations. First, vicarious liability is ‘on the move’ (per Catholic Child Welfare Socy v Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools (Child Welfare Socy)1); and second, ‘[t]he risk of an employee misusing his position is one of life’s unavoidable facts’ (per Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets plc2). To that, add the Court of Appeal’s recent observations that employers do not ‘[become] insurers for violent or other tortious acts by their employees’ (per Bellman Northampton Recruitment Ltd3); but that ‘there will indeed be cases of independent contractors where vicarious liability will be established’ (per Barclays Bank plc v Various Claimants4).

The logic of democratic power is put to an empirical test in Chapter 6. Having identified treaties as the best observable source of international rules, this chapter tests the democratic power argument for international rule–based cooperation systematically in the context of international treaty making, which involves three stages – negotiations, commitment, and compliance. This statistical analysis is based on a dataset of seventy–five international treaties adopted between 1945 and 2008 and is complemented with insights from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The results reveal consistent and robust empirical patterns regarding states’ willingness and ability to cooperate over international treaties, which are generalizable across treaties, issues, and the stages of treaty making. The analysis confirms the centrality of the democratic powers as the chief promoters and adherents of international rules that gradually but inadvertently contribute to the constitutionalization of world politics.