Charitable trusts are created for social purposes, rather than for the benefit of identifiable persons. The beneficiary principle (Morice v Bishop of Durham (1804) 9 Ves 399; 32 ER 656) requires express trusts to have identifiable persons as their object, primarily so that there is someone with sufficient standing to enforce the trust in court. Charitable trusts are an exception to this principle, and thus do not require certainty of object. In order to be valid, however, they must be for the benefit of the public. Additionally, the social purpose they perform must be legally recognised as being charitable. The law concerning charitable purposes is over 500 years old, and sourced in general terms from the Preamble to the Elizabethan Statute of Charitable Uses 1601. Since Pemsel’s case in 1891, charitable purposes are grouped into four headings: trusts for the relief of poverty, the advancement of education, the advancement of religion, and for other purposes beneficial to the community. For purposes of Commonwealth legislation, whether a purpose is charitable is now determined according to s 12 of the Charities Act 2013. Charitable trusts can continue in perpetuity.

In common with many developed world countries, the regulation of labour markets in Australia has been characterised by a divide between workers governed by labour laws (employees) and workers governed by commercial laws, including competition law and policy (everyone else). This divide has meant that access to collective bargaining and the right to strike has largely only been accessible by traditionally employed workers. However, for many decades, Australian competition regulation has included a mechanism to enable self-employed workers and other businesses to seek permission from the competition regulator to engage in collective activities. The express statutory basis for permitting proposed conduct has been on the basis that it will produce ‘net public benefit’ – ie, produce more positive outcomes than harmful ones. In 2021, in recognition of the widespread public benefit that can be gained from collective action, the need for prior permission was removed, and a class exemption for small business collective bargaining was declared. This chapter examines the Australian competition law regime, and the regulation of workers and small businesses, with particular attention to the development and operation of the ‘public benefit’ exemption for collective bargaining.

The goal of the business corporation traditionally has been understood to be the maximization of shareholder wealth. A growing demand for social enterprise has led to the creation of various new forms of business organization, including the benefit corporation, that have the goal of creating both shareholder wealth and other public benefits. Although benefit corporations were developed to overcome the shareholder wealth maximization norm, it is not fair to say that they also overcome shareholder primacy. Properly understood, benefit corporations are shareholder-centric: they exist to allow shareholders to pursue altruistic goals rather than to require them to do so. This essay demonstrates this from the history and structure of the Model Benefit Corporation Act and argues that benefit corporation legislation ought to remain essentially enabling rather than mandatory in nature.

This chapter explores the issue of how decision-making about the distribution of benefits should itself be distributed across generations. It outlines that under the existing rules, there are gaps in the ability of the present generation to change the rate of accumulation or distribute retained assets, even if they think that to do so would increase public benefit. Thus, the chapter investigates potential normative bases for reforming the decision-making balance between past, present and future decision-makers so as to determine the additional circumstances in which the present generation ought to be able to alter accumulation. It does so by reference to cy-près reform discussions and to principles of intergenerational justice. The chapter then identifies potential ways in which the existing rules might be reformed to better accord with these normative bases, drawing on examples from the United Kingdom and the United States. The potential reforms include broader cy-près and administrative scheme grounds and greater discretion for charity controllers to amend administrative machinery and purposes, but coupled with a period of protection for donor intent.

Chapter 2 describes the charity sector (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States and the United Kingdom) and its regulation and investigates the goals of the charity sector and of charity law. In addition, it sketches some broad contours of the extent of charity accumulation and examines the key reasons for and implications raised by accumulation. In discussing the key implications, the chapter identifies normative principles relevant to assessing the intergenerational deferral of benefits, the issue of which generation gets to decide that intergenerational deferral and the potential for enhanced agency costs.

Overviews the church–state relationship across time and nations, drawing attention to countries and circumstances in which the neutrality principle does not apply. Explores the origins of the doctrine, traces its developmental history in relation to religion in various countries, explains key concepts and identifies some different academic interpretations. Discusses the public/private dimensions to religious belief and their balancing within the Western liberal democratic model of government. It gives an overview of the law relating to religious freedom.

This chapter examines charitable trusts in particular the special status that they hold and the range of advantages that charitable trusts hold compared to private trusts such as the relaxation of the rules of certainty of objects and the perpetuity rules. In order to be a charitable trust it must satisfy three key requirements: it must be for a charitable purpose; be exclusively charitable and for the public benefit. The common law definition of a charitable purpose and the statutory definition are considered. The Charities Act 2011 widened the definition of a charity to include such headings as the advancement of the arts and of citizenship and the relief of those in need by reason of youth, age ill-health and other disadvantages as well as more traditional heads such as the relief of poverty. The question of what constitutes public benefit has caused problems of definition as shown in recent case law. Where a charitable gift fails the funds may be transferred to another charity under the rules of cy-pres. These depend on whether there is initial or subsequent failure of a charitable trust. In cases of initial failure a general charitable intent must be shown by the testator.