This article explores the responses of the South African competition authorities to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the socio-economic rights of consumers in relation to the price gouging of essential and medical supplies. After discussing the constitutional and legislative context of socio-economic rights and excessive pricing, it examines the first case in which the competition authorities were called upon to decide on the excessive pricing of medical supplies during COVID-19. The article finds that, while the competition authorities were swift to interpret the Competition Act widely and act against suppliers charging excessive prices, there remains a gap in South Africa's legislative framework as there is no specific legislation regulating price gouging during states of pandemic or disaster. The article identifies the need for legislative development and concludes by offering recommendations for addressing future incidents of price gouging.

SARS-CoV-2 has unleashed an unprecedented global crisis that has caused the demand for essential goods, such as medical and sanitation products, to soar while simultaneously disrupting the very supply chains that allow individuals and institutions to obtain those essential goods. This has resulted in stark price increases and accusations of price gouging. We survey the existing philosophical literature that examines price gouging and identify the key arguments for regulators permitting such behavior and for regulators restricting such behavior. We demonstrate how the existing accounts are designed for localized emergencies rather than global persistent crises such as the coronavirus pandemic. In light of this, we highlight an understudied justification for price gouging that is much more salient during global crises: incentivizing increased production of essential goods. Furthermore, we pinpoint three conditions that help determine whether authorities should restrict price gouging during the coronavirus pandemic and similar global crises.

What, if anything, is wrong with price gouging? Its defenders argue that it increases supply of scarce necessities; critics argue that it is exploitative, inequitable and vicious. In this paper, I argue for its moral wrongness and legal prohibition, without relying on charges of exploitation, inequity or poor character. What is fundamentally wrong with price gouging is that it violates a duty of easy rescue. While legal enforcement of such duties is controversial, a special case can be made for their legal enforcement in this context. This account distinguishes, morally, price gouging by corporations from that of individual entrepreneurs.

This study examines the causal effect of a change in administration of the New York State milk price gouging law on retail milk prices. Specifically, we focus on the November 2008 shift from a threshold pricing policy that consisted of monthly announced prices to a fixed margin policy. Using a regression discontinuity approach, we find lower prices and thus increased consumer welfare for retail milk purchasers in New York State. Furthermore, the change in application of the law may have eliminated previously hypothesized coordination in pricing by retailers through a more competitive retail milk environment.