Multiple selves is a conventional assumption in behavioural welfare economics for modelling intrapersonal well-being. Yet an important question is which self has normative authority over others. In this paper, we advance an argument for what we call the ‘ontological approach’ to personal identity in behavioural welfare economics. According to this approach, ethical questions – such as which preference should be granted normative authority over another – can be informed by the ontological criterion of personal persistence, which aims at determining what it takes for an individual to persist from one time to another.

The classic preference reversal phenomenon, where monetary evaluations contradict risky choices, has been argued to arise due to a focus on outcomes during the evaluation of alternatives, leading to overpricing of long-shot options. Such an explanation makes the implicit assumption that attentional shifts drive the phenomenon. We conducted an eye-tracking study to causally test this hypothesis by comparing a treatment based on cardinal, monetary evaluations with a different treatment avoiding a monetary frame. We find a significant treatment effect in the form of a shift in attention toward outcomes (relative to probabilities) when evaluations are monetary. Our evidence suggests that attentional shifts resulting from the monetary frame of evaluations are a driver of preference reversals.

The Allais Paradox, or common consequence effect, has been a standard challenge to normative theories of risky choice since its proposal over 60 years ago. However, neither its causes nor the conditions necessary to create the effect are well understood. Two experiments test the effects of losses and event splitting on the Allais Paradox. Experiment 1 found that the Allais Paradox occurs for both gain and mixed gambles and is reflected for loss gambles produced by reflection across the origin. Experiment 2 found that the Allais Paradox is eliminated by splitting the outcomes even when the probabilities used do not increase the salience of the common consequence. The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with Cumulative Prospect Theory, the current leading theory of risky choice. However, the results of Experiment 2 are problematic for Cumulative Prospect Theory and suggest that alternate explanations for the Allais Paradox must be sought.

In motor lotteries the probability of success is inherent in a person’s ability to make a speeded pointing movement. By contrast, in traditional economic lotteries, the probability of success is explicitly stated. Decision making with economic lotteries has revealed many violations of rational decision making models. However, with motor lotteries people’s performance is often near optimal, and is well described by statistical decision theory. We report the results of an experiment testing whether motor planning decisions exhibit the attraction effect, a well-known axiomatic violation of some rational decision models. The effect occurs when changing the composition of a choice set alters preferences between its members. We provide the first demonstration that people do exhibit the attraction effect when choosing between motor lotteries. We also found that people exhibited a similar sized attraction effect in motor and traditional economic paradigms. People’s near-optimal performance with motor lotteries is characterized by the efficiency of their decisions. In attraction effect experiments performance is instead characterized by the violation of an axiom. We discuss the extent that axiomatic and efficiency measures can provide insight in assessing the rationality of decision making.

This paper develops tests of independence and stationarity in choice data collected with small samples. The method builds on the approach of Smith and Batchelder (2008). The technique is intended to distinguish cases where a person is systematically changing “true” preferences (from one group of trials to another) from cases in which a person is following a random preference mixture model with independently and identically distributed sampling in each trial. Preference reversals are counted between all pairs of repetitions. The variance of these preference reversals between all pairs of repetitions is then calculated. The distribution of this statistic is simulated by a Monte Carlo procedure in which the data are randomly permuted and the statistic is recalculated in each simulated sample. A second test computes the correlation between the mean number of preference reversals and the difference between replicates, which is also simulated by Monte Carlo. Data of Regenwetter, Dana, and Davis-Stober (2011) are reanalyzed by this method. Eight of 18 subjects showed significant deviations from the independence assumptions by one or both of these tests, which is significantly more than expected by chance.

Objectives: In quality-adjusted life-years (QALY) models, it is customary to weigh life-years with quality of life via multiplication. As a consequence, for positive health states a longer duration has more QALYs than a shorter duration (i.e., longer is better). However, we have found that for poor health states, many prefer to live only a limited amount of time (i.e., longer is worse). Such preferences are said to be maximum endurable time (MET). In the present contribution, the following questions are asked: a) How low does the utility have to be in order for a MET to arise? and b) Do MET preferences occur when patients judge hypothetical health states?

Methods and Results: We reanalyzed data from 176 students for the hypothetical health states of “living with migraines” and “living with metastasized cancer.” For utilities smaller than 0.7 (ranging from 0 to 1), the MET preference rate was larger than 50%. High MET preference rates were also found in two new studies on migraine and esophageal cancer patients, who evaluated hypothetical health states related to their disease.

Conclusions: We discuss the interpretation of the MET preferences and the preference reversal phenomenon. Standard QALY models imply that longer is better. However, we find that more often, longer is worse for poorly evaluated health states. Consider the following question: are 3 years with a weight of 0.3 equally as valuable as 1 year with a weight of 0.9? Our results suggest that the 3-year period may be less valuable because for poor health, many will prefer a 1-year over a 3-year period.