Recognition of a word and its meaning benefits from the sensorimotor information about concepts. However, this phenomenon has been underexplored in second-language (L2) speakers who may rely on more “shallow” representations. Using a megastudy dataset, I investigated how sensorimotor strength affects first-language (L1) and L2 word recognition performance. Bayesian hierarchical regressions revealed that variables associated with physical sensations (interoceptive strength, motor action) and communication experience (head or mouth movement, auditory strength) produced strong effects in both groups. On the other hand, variables associated with concrete objects (visual, haptic experience) and with taste/smell (olfactory, gustatory experience) influenced L1 word recognition performance to a larger extent than in L2. In L2, reliance on semantic information during word recognition was reduced, with stronger effects of lexical variables compared to L1. The findings provide implications for understanding L2 processing mechanisms and demonstrate the usefulness of megastudy datasets in investigating L2 conceptual representations.

Contra both phenomenalists and anti-phenomenalists, I defend the following thesis in this paper: the epistemic power of perceptual experience is grounded in its presentational property that is (i) uniquely possessed by the experience in the good case and (ii) essentially a phenomenal property. In §2, I set the ground for my argument by elaborating on the phenomenalist account of presentational phenomenology. In §3, I argue (against phenomenalism) for the first part of the phenomenal presentation thesis: (i) perceptual experience’s epistemic power is grounded in instances of a presentational property possessed by perceptual experience in the good, but not in the bad case. In §4, I argue (against anti-phenomenalists) for the second part of the phenomenal presentation thesis: (ii) presentational property is essentially a phenomenal property. In §5, I address some potential objections to the phenomenal presentation thesis. §6 concludes.

In this paper, I identify the hard problem of access for epistemological disjunctivism (ED): given that perceptual experience E is opaque with respect to its own epistemic properties, subject S is not in a position to know epistemic proposition (i) (that E is factive with respect to empirical proposition p) just by having E and/or reflecting on E. This is the case even if (i) is true. I first motivate the hard problem of access (Section 2) and then reconstruct and analyze three of the ways in which EDists have argued for the internal accessibility of the factive character of perceptual experience. These arguments explain internal access in terms of the unity of perceptual and rational capacities (Section 3), favoring support (Section 4), and the outward-looking model of self-knowledge (Section 5). My conclusion (Section 6) is that none of these responses works. I then suggest how ED might be modified to succeed as an access internalist epistemology.

The idea that we can perceive absences is becoming increasingly popular in contemporary philosophy of mind, and seeing empty space and hearing silence are alleged to be two paradigmatic examples. In this paper, I remain neutral over the question of whether empty space experiences and experiences of silence are genuinely perceptual phenomena, however, I argue that these experiences do not qualify as absence experiences. Consequently, our experiences of empty space and silence cannot be appealed to as proof of the perceptual view of absence experience.