Chapter 2 presents the book’s main argument about how party rules shape membership. Previous literature is split in its portrayal of party members – some scholars describe members as extremist ideologues, whereas others depict them as partisan loyalists. To reconcile these competing views, Chapter 2 develops a spatial model of membership in which members receive utility from government policy and party proximity, as well as features of party membership unrelated to ideology. The model demonstrates that party rules play a pivotal role in shaping a party’s overall membership level and distribution. The model predicts that decentralized parties attract more members than centralized parties, all else equal. However, decentralized parties’ members should be more ideologically extreme than their counterparts in centralized parties.

This chapter argues that while great strides have been made to humanise the law of diplomatic protection, its practice in the courtroom is not in alignment with this as the protected individual does not participate in proceedings. It first dismantles the famous Mavrommatis fiction and argues that other conditions for diplomatic protection (such as nationality and the exhaustion of local remedies) and its features (such as state discretion and state responsibility) have been increasingly humanised to place emphasis on the individual. Second, it analyses the case law to show how the individual does not participate in proceedings at the Peace Palace. Finally, it provides suggestions to advocate for stronger procedural participation for the injured individual in cases of diplomatic protection at the ICJ.

This chapter argues that advisory proceedings have the procedural flexibility to enable individuals’ participation, despite the Court’s reluctance to bring such participation to fruition. It first dispels the myth that witnesses are limited to the confines of contentious proceedings. It then discusses the Court’s sparse engagement with amici curiae. Finally, it explores the potential of the analogous extension of Article 66(2) of the Court’s Statute, authorising the furnishing of information by entities beyond states and international organisations.

The political idea of self-government has a natural elaboration, which is that a society is self-governing when it is ruled by the will of the people of that society. A variety of attempts to vindicate popular will conceptions of self-government exist but I argue that they are fatally flawed. In its place, we need a conception of self-government that is deflationary (that is does not rely on the existence of a popular will) but nevertheless quite demanding. I discuss some deflationary accounts of self-government and I argue for an account that emphasizes an egalitarian collective decision-making process but that also recognizes the importance of outcomes. I argue that attention to the conditions necessary to the achievement of self-government of an egalitarian sort is essential to how we are to think of the proper aims of constitutional institutions. We need to attend to how information is disseminated to citizens and how citizens can have the sophistication necessary to understand information. An egalitarian conception of self-government can show how the constitution of a society should be structured so as to achieve equality in these two dimensions of the information system.

Arguments that corruption is “grease for the wheels,” benefiting economic growth, are difficult to sustain. State-level findings show that extensive corruption tends to leave a state poorer, and more economically unequal, than states where the problem is less significant. Citizens’ ability to respond to those difficulties by political means is in turn influenced by corruption itself, general levels of political participation, the strength or weakness of trust in officials and fellow citizens, the amount and quality of political news coverage in the mass media, and a state’s social composition. Problems of low trust could conceivably be addressed via effective universally applied public policies, but those in turn can challenge, and be challenged by, key aspects of America’s long-term bargain between government and citizens and by citizens’ expectations of each other. Corruption often undermines trust, and trust can underwrite effective reforms, but the relationships are complex and contingent upon levels of trust that are neither too low nor too high.

The paragraphs of article III of the Convention set out four ’other acts’ governed by the Convention: conspiracy: conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide. The first three of these are ’inchoate’ offences in that the crime of genocide is not actually committed. If a conspiracy succeeds, the relevant offence is genocide, or complicity in genocide. A conspiracy that does not succeed is punishable under article III. The same holds for attempt and for direct and public incitement. Incitement that results in genocide is punishable as genocide, or complicity in genocide. Complicity in international criminal law is developed in the statutes of the various tribunals and by case law, although there is no unanimity as to its form. The ad hoc tribunals developed a doctrine known as ’joint criminal enterprise’ whereas at the International Criminal Court complicity may be addressed as ’co-perpetration’ or ’indirect co-perpetration’. It is also possible to prosecute genocide under the superior or command responsibility doctrine.

This chapter explores the importance of multi-stakeholder participation in advancing biodiversity and nature conservation efforts across the MENA region. It begins with a contextual overview and discusses the interconnected requisites of effective multi-stakeholder participation. It examines approaches facilitating bottom-up implementation and fostering productive collaboration among multiple parties. This chapter stresses the importance of inclusivity and multi-party collaboration in the development and implementation of innovative and sustainable conservation initiatives. It concludes by emphasizing that a multi-stakeholder participation approach is indispensable for effectively tackling the challenges of biodiversity and nature conservation in the MENA region.

A broad consensus has emerged in recent years that although rumours, conspiracy theories and fabricated information are far from new, in the changed structure and operating mechanisms of the public sphere today we are faced with something much more challenging than anything to date, and the massive scale of this disinformation can even pose a threat to the foundations of democracy. However, the consensus extends only to this statement, and opinions differ considerably about the causes of the increased threat of disinformation, whom to blame for it, and the most effective means to counter it. From the perspective of freedom of speech, the picture is not uniform either, and there has been much debate about the most appropriate remedies. It is commonly argued, for example, that the free speech doctrine of the United States does not allow for effective legal action against disinformation, while in Europe there is much more room for manoeuvre at the disposal of the legislator.

I address three questions. First, how do Eastern theologians configure the way the incarnation is rendered as God’s original intention, and how significant is that insight? The answer is that this is central to their portrayal of God’s purpose. Second, what precisely is God’s purpose in the incarnation? The answer lies in the notion of deification, our being made divine, a concept pivotal to Eastern theology – and yet one that seems in significant respects problematic. Third, are there ways in which Eastern theologians portray God’s purpose that are less problematic, yet equally integral to their notion of God’s original and constant purpose? The answer is, yes there are. I conclude with three key motifs that I find more transferable yet nonetheless wholly authentic to the Orthodox theological imagination: communion, participation and transfiguration.

The eight dimensions of being with, outlined in detail in my A Nazareth Manifesto and elsewhere in their missiological, ethical and public policy implications, are here explored in their full scriptural dimensions. Presence, attention, mystery, delight, participation, partnership, enjoyment and glory each have profound resonances in Old and New Testaments, and each provides a continuous thread through incarnation, the reason for creation, the nature of Jesus’ ministry and death, the work of the Holy Spirit, the church and heavenly destiny – in relation to God, to one another and to the whole creation. They affirm how the incarnation is not a means to an end (such as saving us from our sins) but an end in itself, and they expand the notion of being with into a multidimensional concept with rich resonances.

Pikka-Maaria Laine and Eero Vaara examine participation in strategy research in general and in strategy as practice research in particular. Participation is arguably a key issue of strategizing but has received relatively little explicit attention in strategy as practice research. The authors differentiate four perspectives on participation: participation as a non-issue, participation as part of strategy process dynamics, participation as produced in and through organizational practices, and participation as an issue of subjectivity. The authors then offer ideas for future research on participation. These include extending strategic agency to non-managerial actors, focusing on co-orientation in the interaction of actors in multifaceted strategy processes, analyzing institutional and cultural differences in participation, studying socio-materiality and its role in enabling or promoting participation, analyzing polyphony and dialogicality, and developing the critical perspectives needed to deal more comprehensively with issues such as resistance and empowerment.

In this chapter, I argue for an account of worship as real union. To worship the Divine is to participate in the goodness of God, in an ontological way. But how can we really participate in God? The answer depends on the coherence of an important distinction between the essence and divine energies of God. We cannot participate in the essence of God, otherwise the distinction between creature and creator breaks down. Rather, we participate in the divine energies of God. Although there is a difference between the divine essence and the divine energies, the divine energies are not something distinct from God. God interacts with us and reveals himself to us through the divine energies. The divine energies are the activities of God that can penetrate our inner being and change us from potentially being good to actually being good. Thus, worship, in the proper and strict sense, divinizes us.