Even though wide access to any warranted information in the modern age, the problem of unfounded belief is still relevant, since these beliefs often lead to negative consequences (e.g., vaccination refusal, homeopathic treatment, etc.). The aim of this study was testing the relationship of social worldviews with paranormal beliefs and conspiracy beliefs. We assumed dimensionality hypothesis based on functional standpoint that there should be a general factor (underlying all the domains of paranormal beliefs and generic conspiracist beliefs), which has associations with the social worldviews as well. Derived our analysis from the survey of 228 participants (Mage = 30.6, SD = 11.7), we found that (a) the structure of paranormal and generic conspiracist beliefs can be described by a bifactor model; (b) the general factor of paranormal and generic conspiracist beliefs in the bifactor model was positively associated with global belief in just world and dangerous worldview; (c) paranormal beliefs were positively associated with global belief in just world and negatively associated with competitive worldview; (d) generic conspiracist beliefs were positively associated with dangerous worldview, competitive worldview, and zero-sum game belief; (e) contrary to our hypotheses, there was no evidence for any negative association of paranormal beliefs with dangerous worldview or zero-sum game belief and for any negative association of generic conspiracist beliefs with global belief in just world. We claim that the unfounded beliefs can be of some functional nature, demonstrating a connection with social worldviews, which opens up new perspectives for considering this problem within the framework of social psychology.

Previous studies have brought conflicting results regarding the effects of valence and arousal in visual word processing. Some authors have pointed to participants’ individual differences as one of the possible explanations for these inconsistencies. The main aim of the present research was to examine whether participants’ individual differences in the level of epistemically unwarranted beliefs (EUB) contribute to these conflicting results. Therefore, participants who varied in their level of paranormal, pseudoscientific and conspiracy beliefs (assessed by self-report measures) performed a lexical decision task (LDT) and a recognition memory task. Linear mixed-effects models over LDT response times revealed that the effects of words’ emotional content (both valence and arousal) were modulated by the degree of individuals’ EUB. In addition, signal detection theory analyses showed that in the recognition task (but not in the LDT) response bias became more liberal as individuals’ EUB increased. These patterns of effects were not general to all EUB instances. The obtained results highlight the need to consider participants’ individual differences in affective word processing and signal detection. In addition, this study reveals some basic psychological mechanisms that would underlie EUB, a fact that has both theoretical and applied relevance.