This chapter talks about the intimate connections between identity, quantification, and number. The precise relation between the uncountability thesis and the quantification and identity principles is not easy to establish. The falsity of any of the three principles (identity, quantification, and number) would appear to entail the uncountability thesis. Portions of stuff need not contrast in any way with their surroundings, and can have arbitrary boundaries. Peter Simons has proposed an argument suggesting that the truth conditions of certain sentences must appeal to uncountable things. The chapter argues that portions of gunk would be countable, and then goes on to define 'quasinumerical' descriptions. If the definitions of the quasinumerical descriptions make sense, there could be a population of beings who spoke a language identical to ours except that they use quasinumerical terms where we use genuine numerical ones. The chapter ends with an explanation on the number of things.