The first part of this chapter focuses on the shift in Anglo-Spanish relations brought on by the death of the British ambassador in Madrid. It delves into the critical role that individuals can play during diplomatic negotiations and the subsequent effects they can have on issues relating to neutrality and sea power. Keene’s relationship with William Pitt and with Ricardo Wall largely kept Anglo-Spanish relations afloat and working toward an eventuality where Spain would remain neutral and willing to compromise on neutral rights. Keene actively worked to persuade Wall to accept the Court of Prize Appeal as the best mechanism to safeguard Spanish neutrality but failed to achieve his goal before he died. Keene’s successor, Lord Bristol, proved much less effective and relations between the two governments deteriorated further. It was under these trying political circumstances that the San Juan Baptista came before the Court of Prize Appeal. Lord Hardwicke’s intent appeared to be to ensure that the first Spanish appellate case be decided in favour of the Spanish in order to win Spanish government support for the Court of Prize Appeal as a fair and viable mechanism to safeguard neutral rights.

This chapter begins Part III of the book which focuses on Anglo-Spanish relations during the Seven Years’ War and focuses particularly on the first two Spanish cases to come before the Court of Prize Appeal. This serves as a contextual chapter for Anglo- Spanish affairs and introduces the specific people and dynamics within the Spanish Court that were critical to negotiations over neutrality. It also introduces the cases of the San Juan Baptista and the Jesús, Maria, y José. The chapter highlights that the political and diplomatic contexts of Anglo-Spanish relations were markedly different from those of Anglo-Dutch relations and that preserving Spanish neutrality was, in many ways, much more fraught and complicated. This was due largely to internal Spanish political events (such as the death of King Ferdinand VI and the death of the British ambassador to Spain) and Anglo-Spanish maritime grievances that went beyond questions of prize-taking but spoke to the core of Spanish fears that British maritime hegemony would drastically alter the power of balance in the Americas and adversely affect neutral nations.

The latter years of Spain’s neutrality during the war (1759–62) saw an even greater deterioration in Anglo-Spanish relations. Ministers from both Courts attempted to preserve and salvage Spanish neutrality, but unresolved diplomatic grievances, as well as the deaths of both the Spanish king, Ferdinand VI, and the British monarch, George II, foiled their efforts and any gains made by the case of the San Juan Baptista. The increasing decay and eventual breakdown of Anglo-Spanish relations during the war demonstrate that the tactics used to ensure Dutch neutrality could not so easily be transferred to maintain Spanish neutrality. This chapter begins with the appellate case of the Jesús, Maria, y José and a close look at the legal arguments presented for both the Spanish shipowners and the British privateers who took the ship as prize. The proceedings of the court are analysed alongside the political developments between the Spanish and British ministries, and illustrate how they influenced one another. The case demonstrates Hardwicke’s continued attempts to make legal arguments that would set the Rule of the War of 1756 as the standard rule for how Britain’s prize court system would judge the legality of enemy goods carried in neutral ships.

The cases of the Maria Theresa and the America were designed, by Hardwicke, Holderness, and Newcastle, to instil confidence in the Dutch government that the Court of Prize Appeal would safeguard the Dutch neutral rights that had been agreed throughout the first part of the war. They were also designed to instil confidence in British privateers and naval captains and ensure that French colonial trade carried in neutral ships could still largely be stopped and condemned as legal prize. This chapter focuses on the two appellate cases and the legal arguments presented. These are then tied to the legal and strategic maritime thinking of Lord Hardwicke and his creation of the Rule of the War of 1756. This rule became the bedrock for how Britain would understand and negotiate neutral rights over the course of the next major European maritime wars. The basic premise of the rule was that trade that was prohibited to a neutral during times of peace would be considered by the British prize court system to be prohibited in times of war. The chapter, through an analysis of Dutch cases in the Court of Prize Appeal, examines how and why Hardwicke developed this rule.

The Conclusion delves into the strategic and legal legacies of the Seven Years’ War. It ties the Seven Years’ War and the unresolved tensions around maritime neutrality to the outbreak of Anglo-Dutch and Anglo-Spanish hostilities during the American War of Independence. It does so by examining the peace treaty of 1763 wherein no new significant arrangements were made about neutral rights between the Spanish and the British. The argument is made that the ambiguity of existing treaties left both governments room to continue negotiations whilst the Rule of the War of 1756 would provide an understanding of how British prize courts would treat neutral ships in future conflicts. The chapter examines the legacy of the Court of Prize Appeal and the thinking behind the rule. It discusses how the court and the rule were used in subsequent conflicts through the Napoleonic Wars and the role that individual judges took in making the rule a critical or underplayed element of British maritime strategic thinking. The rule loomed large in British maritime law for many wars after Hardwicke created it and it is, perhaps, one of the best illustrations of the link between law, sea power, and strategic thinking.