National dialogues hold significant promise for conflict resolution because they enable diverse interests to engage in an inclusive negotiation process. However, peacemakers and conflict parties need to have realistic expectations. This chapter makes two arguments regarding the effectiveness of national dialogues. The first is that national dialogues are well-placed to strengthen and legitimise elite agreements that have already been struck, but not well-placed to develop elite-level commitment to dialogue when none has previously been built. The second argument is that, in order to make a positive contribution, national dialogues need to be able to adjust flexibly to changing political realities and to avoid rigid rules and structures. National dialogues which are able to adapt their negotiation formats are more likely to make reach decisions which are implemented by the parties.

This chapter shows how many of the events and much of the work of the second interim government in Tunisia, the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) and Troika, were directly linked to or produced by the behaviors, traits, and decisions of the TPA. The chapter begins by explaining how – in line with the previous chapter – the TPA was not operating in wide open territory; rather, it faced many constraints by nature of its role as a first interim government. These included pressure to swiftly hand power to an elected government, thus forcing it to work quickly; the need for care as it tried not to overstep its mandate, thus constraining its decision-making ability; and a host of constraints created by the legacies of the outgoing autocracy and inexperience with democratic government, including its own lack of preparation. The chapter then describes the series of events and actions under the TPA's successor, each with its own echoes of what had come before.