In the domain of moral decision making, models in which emotion and deliberation constitute competing dual-systems have become increasingly popular. Currently, the favored explanation of this interaction is what Evans (2008) termed a “default-interventionist” (DI) process where moral decisions are the result of a prepotent emotional response, which can be overridden with substantial deliberative effort. Although this “emotion-then-deliberation” sequence is often assumed, existing methods have lacked the requisite process resolution to clearly depict the nature of this interaction. The present work utilized continuous mouse tracking, or response dynamics, to develop and test predictions of these DI models of moral decision making. Study 1 utilized previously published moral dilemmas to validate the method for use with such complex stimuli. Although the data replicated typical choice and RT patterns, the process metrics provided by the response trajectories did not demonstrate the online preference reversals predicted by DI models. Study 2 utilized more rigorously constructed stimuli and an alternative presentation format to provide the strongest possible test of DI predictions, but again failed to show the predicted reversals. In summary, neither experiment provided data in accordance with the predictions of popular DI dual-systems models, which suggests that researchers should consider models allowing for concurrent activation of deliberative and emotional systems, or reconceptualize moral decisions within the typical multiattribute decision framework.

Trolley problems have been used in the development of moral theory and the psychological study of moral judgments and behavior. Most of this research has focused on people from the West, with implicit assumptions that moral intuitions should generalize and that moral psychology is universal. However, cultural differences may be associated with differences in moral judgments and behavior. We operationalized a trolley problem in the laboratory, with economic incentives and real-life consequences, and compared British and Chinese samples on moral behavior and judgment. We found that Chinese participants were less willing to sacrifice one person to save five others, and less likely to consider such an action to be right. In a second study using three scenarios, including the standard scenario where lives are threatened by an on-coming train, fewer Chinese than British participants were willing to take action and sacrifice one to save five, and this cultural difference was more pronounced when the consequences were less severe than death.

In ten studies (N = 9187), I systematically investigated the direction and sizeof seven helping effects (the identifiable-victim effect, proportion dominanceeffect, ingroup effect, existence effect, innocence effect, age effect andgender effect). All effects were tested in three decision modes (separateevaluation, joint evaluation and forced choice), and in their weak form (equalefficiency), or strong form (unequal efficiency). Participants read about one,or two, medical help projects and rated the attractiveness of and allocatedresources to the project/projects, or choose which project to implement. Theresults show that the included help-situation attributes vary in their: (1)Evaluability – e.g., rescue proportion is the easiest to evaluate inseparate evaluation. (2) Justifiability – e.g., people prefer to savefewer lives now rather than more lives in the future, but not fewer identifiedlives rather than more statistical lives. (3) Prominence – e.g., peopleexpress a preference to help females, but only when forced to choose.

A recent study indicates that acute stress affects moral decision making (Youssef et al., in press). The current study examines whether results can be replicated using a different kind of stressor and a different kind of stress measurement. We induced stress in 25 participants with a cover-story of an anticipated speech. Another group of 25 participants was tested in a control condition. Stress levels and stress responses were assessed with questionnaires and heart rate. All participants performed a moral decision-making task describing moral dilemmas. These dilemmas were either personal or impersonal and each offered a utilitarian and a non-utilitarian option. Acutely stressed participants, compared to control participants, made fewer utilitarian judgments and needed longer for making a decision. Individual physiological stress response was related to fewer utilitarian judgments. Results are in line with those previously found although different instruments were used.

Would you redirect a trolley to save five people even if it means that the trolley will run over a person on the side track? Most people say they would. Would you push that same person into the path of the trolley in order to save the five? Most people say they would not. These sorts of intuitive moral judgments are made rapidly and seem almost automatic. Now imagine a combined choice context where one can redirect a trolley, push a person in its path or do nothing. The number of lives lost from intervening can be varied. The most straightforward interpretations of current theories of moral judgment predict either no effect or that the combined context will lead to greater focus on lives lost. In contrast, we observe a similarity effect such that utilitarian choice may become less attractive in the combined choice context.

This study examined whether the Foreign-Language effect, an increase in bilinguals’ rate of rational decisions to moral dilemmas in their foreign versus their native language, is influenced by emotion and the modality in which the dilemmas are presented. 154 Dutch–English bilinguals were asked to read and listen to personal and impersonal moral dilemmas in Dutch or in English. Importantly, the reading task had the character of a self-paced reading task to resemble the listening task as closely as possible. In both modalities, participants’ task was to indicate whether the proposed action was appropriate or not. Results showed that the Foreign-Language effect was present for personal dilemmas only. In addition, an effect of modality demonstrated that participants took overall more rational decisions during the listening than the reading task. These findings give insight in the interplay between language, emotion and task demands, revealing that moral decision making is context-dependent.