This chapter examines the common assumption that, whereas Elizabeth I’s reign was at the zenith of the age of common law, we have now moved into an age of statute. The Elizabethans themselves thought this was already happening: there were so many matters, such as poor relief and economic regulation, which the common law was powerless to tackle. The volume of legislation has continued to increase dramatically, and yet the sphere of the common law is still large and the interpretation of statutes is governed by common-law principles. The fiction of legislative intent, the concept of equity, and the mischief rule were all much the same as today’s interpretative techniques. The largest jurisprudential change has been the common law’s loss of immortality. A statute can, in an instant, extinguish an immemorial principle of law. The extinction survives the repeal of the statute, so that much of the current law is contained in repealed statutes. In this connection, the effects of the Interpretation Acts are considered. Legislation has come to dominate the law in terms of abrogative power as well as bulk, but the common law is superior in terms of clarity, flexibility and self-correction.

While legislation is enacted by the Legislative Council (or under its authority), the courts have a role in the interpretation of legislation. This chapter discusses the various common law approaches to statutory interpretation that are likely to be adopted by Hong Kong courts. Moreover, this chapter goes through the aids to interpretation within an ordinance, external aids to interpretation, presumptions which protect basic values, interpretation of the Basic Law and resolving conflicts found in bilingual legislation. A case study is used to illustrate how the courts balance different interpretive considerations. Recognising how judges interpret laws will help hone the skills of legal reasoning (thinking like a judge).