ERISA regulates most benefit plans offered by private employers, both pension plans and welfare plans. Pension plans systematically defer compensation until termination of employment (or longer), and welfare plans provide other types of benefits designated by statute, of which health insurance is the most costly by far. Because of the importance of ensuring retirement income, health care, and other socially valuable welfare benefits (such as disability income and life insurance), the Code permits plans with certain features to “qualify” for favorable tax treatment, on the theory that such a subsidy encourages provision of benefits that would not otherwise be available. ERISA’s chief policy aims are to promote informed decision making by workers; to prevent mismanagement and abuse of plan assets by administrators; to protect worker reliance on the benefit promises made; and to preserve employer choice with regard to offering benefits and, provided that minimum standards are met, in tailoring benefit programs to serve the needs of the business.

Chapter 5 sets out a functional comparative analysis. In this way, the recognition and enforcement approaches can be isolated from the context-specific domains and concerns which gave rise to them. This formalisation of comparison highlights doctrinal convergence, and the increasing transnationalisation of recognition and enforcement. At first glance, the degree of convergence is somewhat surprising given that each approach is grounded in a different underlying legal instrument, separated in time by many decades, epistemologically constituted by different international actors and stakeholders, and overseen or developed by different governmental or intergovernmental organisations, and, arguably, aimed at differing goals. However, read together with the historical and contextual analysis in the earlier chapters of this part, a shared core of recognition and enforcement practice can be distilled and compared. Doing so offers an initial basis from which to analyse the future of recognition and enforcement – both in terms of anticipating how existing approaches are likely to be interpreted or applied but also with respect to ways in which such approaches may develop or evolve over time.

The chapter explores the ECHR approach to the minimum standards of the environmental minimum. These standards apply once a specific risk has been established and are derived either from domestic and international legal norms, or in lieu of these, established and emerging scientific evidence. Notably, unclear or contradictory scientific evidence grants states a wide margin of appreciation in formulating a regulatory response. Should a violation of minimum standards be established, individuals have a claim based on the right invoked at the specific risk stage. The question for the ECHR case law is whether it requires the enforcement of legal norms, and mandates subsidiary recourse to established and emerging scientific evidence in their absence. The ECHR generally meets these requirements: a clear majority of cases where domestic environmental regulations were ignored by authorities also resulted in a violation of the ECHR. However, the chapter acknowledges some enduring concerns, notably the failure of the Court to invariabley find violations where states fail to consistently enforce domestic law and its deferential approach in some cases where a state had no legal norms to enforce.

The chapter introduces and defends the environmental minimum as a framework for the protections (and correlative duties) that environmental human rights require. It develops the guiding principles of the framework, modelled on the characteristics of human rights identified by James Nickel and as specified through the lens of environmental protection following Joseph Raz's interest theory of rights. The core prinicples of the environmental minimum that allow courts to make sense of environmental harm in the context of human rights protection regimes are: the specific risk principle, which acts as the trigger for the environmental minimum, requiring a specific risk to a recognised right arising from environmental harm; the minimum standards, which specify the baseline standard of review that courts ought to employ and are based on domestic and international legal norms, as well as established and emerging evidence that is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community; and finally the high priority characteristic, which guides the balancing of environmental protection with competing interests based on human rights.