The advantages of acquiring and exploiting advanced military technologies for increased military leverage is self-evident. At the same time, we must recognize that we live in an era when the notion of what constitutes a “militarily relevant technology” is becoming harder to identify and define. The 4IR – particularly artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, “big data,” and the like – is largely embedded in the commercial high-tech sector; at the same time, the military potential of the 4IR is both vast and mostly self-evident. For all these reasons, therefore, militaries and governments around the world are increasingly focused on how and where advanced commercial technologies, innovations, and breakthroughs might create new capacities for military power, advantage, and leverage. This process of exploiting such civilian-based advanced technologies for military use is increasingly known as “military–civil fusion” (MCF). MCF is essentially about transferring advanced commercial technologies to military use through the joint civil–military development and application of cutting-edge technologies to military products.

As the fourth industrial revolution (4IR) has become one of the central paths to military modernization, the ability of states to implement military–civil fusion (MCF) will likely factor more in how militaries gain advantages over their rivals. Critical 4IR technologies are increasingly viewed as key force multipliers. Many countries have adopted measures to promote MCF in order to exploit the 4IR for military needs but the implementation of MCF remains challenging. Constraints include differing priorities between the military and commercial sectors when it comes to 4IR and the reluctance of civilian enterprises to enter into technology partnerships with the military. Countries with restrictive, statist approaches toward economic development, such as China and India, may find themselves stymied by a culture that hinders innovation, as opposed to the United States and Israel where entrepreneurism, experimentation, and risk-taking are encouraged. Nevertheless, MCF is likely to become a core military-technological development strategy for most countries seeking great power status or who see technology as a critical force multiplier in national defense.

The defense industry in the United States that emerged during World War II is embedded in the nation’s civilian sector but arms manufacturing has remained segregated from the civilian economy. Earlier rounds of civil–military integration, particularly in aerospace and computing, resulted in military and civilian technology silos, despite efforts in the post-Cold War era to create a dual-use technology base. In the twenty-first century, however, the US military’s emerging technological requirements have driven a new effort to exploit fourth industrial revolution (4IR) technologies through military–civil fusion (MCF). In particular, the US military seeks to exploit such 4IR technologies as AI, quantum computing, microelectronics, and autonomous systems. The US Department of Defense has undertaken several initiatives to access advanced commercial innovations, particularly in the IT sector. AI is particularly driving MCF as this is seen as a critical force multiplier in future warfare. It is too soon to ascertain how successful current US efforts at MCF will be as many of the current programs sponsoring MCF are still at the initial stages of exploration, experimentation, and evaluation.

Many advanced commercial technologies increasingly offer new and potentially significant opportunities for defense applications that, in turn, could greatly affect military power and the metrics of military advantage over potential rivals. This book is grounded in two interconnected arguments. First, the technologies of the emerging fourth industrial revolution (4IR) will have a significant impact on future military effectiveness and advantage. Second, if militaries want to harness the technological potential of the 4IR, then they must craft a new kind of civil–military cooperation, which has become known as military–civil fusion (MCF). MCF will likely grow as a competitive strategy for nations seeking to exploit advanced technologies for military innovation and, subsequently, military advantage.

The Middle East was built on two complementary economies: agriculture and pastoralism. Given the dry climate and difficult terrain, the region could probably not have developed a rich urban civilization without pastoral nomadism. Nomads made it possible to cross deserts; provided animal produce for cities and trade; guidance, protection and livestock for caravans; and both horses and soldiers for war. They also contributed to state-building. States founded by the Bedouin were usually small regional polities, often in regions bordered by states competing for power, such as the Roman and Sassanian Empires or the Abbasid and Fatimid Caliphates. The steppe nomads had a more stratified social structure and their own imperial ideology; the Seljuqs, Mongol, and Timurids founded larger states with imperial pretentions. From the fifteenth century on conquests came from within, largely from the nomadic tribes of Anatolia and Transoxiana. The decline of nomads after the early 19th century was due partly to new weaponry and growing state power, but also to the transport revolution and the decline of the market for livestock. Nomads ceased to be necessary for war, trade and border protection but survive as providers of livestock products.