Immigrant minorities adapt to many of the practices and values of their host society. This adaptation is a two-way street. The state and the courts can be called upon to take into account the impact that some of these practices with a religious or cultural basis might have. Thus, as we learned from the Bruker v. Marcovitz decision, an obligation of a religious nature can be characterized as civil in nature when it is part of a contract signed in Canada. The same is true when a contract is entered into while the parties resided abroad. Although such an obligation can be considered justiciable, it is not always easy for Canadian courts to respect the specific nature of the standard in question. Indeed, judges must understand the scope of the standards involved, the function of certain institutions, or the importance of practices with which they are not necessarily familiar. When it comes to the mahr, or dowry, an examination of jurisprudence shows that the specific nature of this practice is not always understood, and in cases where it is recognized, the execution of the obligation it entails cannot always be ensured.