Defined benefit pension funds invest in illiquid asset classes for return, diversification or liability hedging reasons. So far, little is known about factors influencing how much they invest in illiquid assets. We conjecture that liquidity and capital requirements are pivotal in this decision. Short-term pension payments and margining on derivative contracts generate liquidity requirements, while regulations impose capital requirements. Consistent with our model we empirically find that these requirements create a hump-shaped impact of liability duration on the fraction of risky assets invested in illiquid assets. Further, we report that pension fund size, type, and funding ratio impact illiquid assets allocations.

This paper reviews the market failures that may justify the need for liquidity regulation, assesses whether liquidity regulation is a necessary complement to Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) policies, capital regulation and prompt corrective action, surveys the available evidence on the net benefits of liquidity regulation, and concludes by outlining research directions useful to improve bank regulation design.