Unlike most of the other jurisdictions discussed in this book, the United States (US) does not currently have, nor did it ever have, a utility model or other system of second-tier patent protection. This being said, discussion and debate over the institution of such a system in the US has been ongoing for more than a century. In this chapter, we discuss the history and current status of this debate, as well as alternative approaches that US agencies and legislators have taken to address the needs and concerns of small and medium-sized inventors.

Chapter 2 defines efficiency. The efficiency criterion here is cost-benefit analysis, where cost is institution cost (including information and transaction costs) and benefit is what is called “allocative efficiency” in the literature. My efficiency criterion builds on 60 years of law-and-economics research in property law, but I believe that this is the first time that efficiency has been formulated in this way. Chapter 2 positions efficiency as a first-order value, while welfare is a second-order value that includes efficiency and other first-order values such as distribution of wealth. In addition, Chapter 2 introduces the concepts of ex ante viewpoint and the property rule versus the liability rule, both of which will be drawn on in later chapters.

Chapter 5 explores the nature of international economic obligations. It suggests that remedies in international economic regimes have a restorative rather than punitive purpose. It is argued that attribution of breach may not be relevant, or that relevant, in the international economic law context. This study posits that what international courts and tribunals ask is not who is responsible for a breach but rather who is best placed to bear responsibility. In international economic law, shared responsibility typically raises the question of the proper respondent(s).