Once the Court has established that an interference with a Convention right meets the requirement of lawfulness, the second main requirement for the interference to be justifiable is that it pursues a legitimate aim. The express limitation clauses of the Convention further do not only require the aims pursued to be legitimate, but they also provide exhaustive lists of the aims which can legitimately be served. Although the test of legitimate aim does not play a large role in the Court’s review of justification for restrictions, this Chapter addresses the application and interpretation of the legitimate aim requirement. Special attention is paid to the situation of a discrepancy between stated and real aims and the situation where more than one aim is pursued. In addition, Article 18 ECHR is discussed, which states that restrictions cannot be applied for any other purpose than that for which they have been prescribed. The Merabishvili case and the requirements defined therein are central to this discussion.

In the context of a difficult transition from war to peace, arrangements aimed at achieving peace (such as power-sharing, including autonomy) may come into tension with human rights (such as non-discrimination or indigenous rights). When this happens, peace and human rights are often unhelpfully characterized as binary or even mutually exclusive. The aim of this chapter is to query this binary characterisation, using three case studies where a particular tension was contested before a court: Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Philippines and El Salvador. The chapter shows that since neither peace, nor (most) human rights are absolute, it is possible to weigh the two against each other; and the tension can be framed in a way that is more conducive to its resolution, by conceptualising peace as a fundamental public purpose, a legitimate aim, and/or a human right, thus internalising it in human rights reasoning, rather than treating it as external.

This chapter discusses how the European Court of Human Rights interprets and applies the European Convention on Human Rights. It examines the Court's approach to interpretation which stresses the Convention receives an effective, evolving and autonomous interpretation. The key principles involved in deciding whether a right has been appropriately limited or restricted are presented: legality or lawfulness, legitimate aim and proportionality. The margin of appreciation and positive obligations doctrines are explained.