As urbanization continues to fuel land and property conflicts in rural China, shareholding has been promoted as a reform in property rights that would enhance bottom-up control in the governance of collective assets. The recent proliferation of community-based shareholding companies has been credited for giving villagers new identities as shareholders, which entitle them to vote, receive their share of collective profits, and elect the managers of their wealth. This paper critically appraises these reforms and offers a contrarian perspective to singular narratives of villager empowerment. While shareholding clarifies villagers’ rights of control, income and transfer in collective property, the effective exercise of such powers is often forestalled on the ground by the concentration of power in elite hands. To the extent that formal and informal constraints on cadre power remain tenuous, shareholding could function as a vehicle for the powerful to appropriate collective wealth rather than as a weapon of the weak.

China is experiencing rapid urbanisation and population ageing, alongside sometimes contentious rural land consolidation. These on-going social, economic, political and demographic changes are especially problematic for older people in rural areas. In these regions, social and institutional support arrangements are less developed than in urban areas; older people have few options for re-settlement but are resistant to or incapable of adjusting to high-rise apartment living. In 2012–13, we gathered rich qualitative and quantitative data on over 600 older residents in 12 villages under the jurisdiction of City L in north-east coastal China to analyse residents’ living arrangement choices during the village renovation process. We compared villages with and without senior centres to shed light on the correlates of co-residence and independent living. Senior centres play a role in balancing the burden on rural Chinese families resulting from population ageing, smaller families, widespread migration for work, and the rapid urbanisation that is restructuring land rights and social support arrangements.

Despite common national institutions and incentives to remake urban landscapes to anchor growth, generate land-lease revenues and display a capacious administration, Chinese urban governments exhibit varying levels of control over land. This article uses a paired comparison of Dalian and Harbin in China's north-east to link differences in local political economies to land politics. Dalian, benefiting from early access to foreign capital, consolidated its control over urban territory through the designation of a development zone, which realigned local economic interests and introduced dual pressures for enterprises to restructure and relocate. Harbin, facing capital shortages, distributed urban territory to assuage the losers of reform and promote economic growth. The findings suggest that 1) growth strategies, and the territorial politics they produce, are products of the post-Mao urban hierarchy rather than of socialist legacies, and 2), perhaps surprisingly, local governments exercise the greatest control over urban land in cities that adopted market reforms earliest.