This article contributes to our understanding of how and why developing countries would comply with international banking regulatory standards, Basel standards. The article demonstrates the interplay between opportunity structures constituted by transnationalization of public policymaking and domestic institutional setting, and how forces of compliance resonate in the domestic politics of compliance. The empirical findings are based on Turkey's compliance with Basel standards. It relies on fieldwork that involves semi-structured qualitative interviews with senior regulators and bankers, which are complemented with analysis of secondary data. The article shows that a capable and willing regulator could capitalize on the top-down policymaking style which restricts the regulatee's access to international negotiations, and sets the terms at the domestic level. Direct access to international negotiations, resource asymmetry in favor of the regulator, and superior “negotiation knowledge” helped the regulator pacify a critical, skeptical regulatee, and drive the compliance process. The article also shows that the compliance process takes place at three stages: policy formulation at the international level, an “interpretation stage” in between the international and the domestic levels, and finally the domestic policy process.

The complex ways in which technical challenges of trial design provoke, and are provoked by, ethical, commercial and political factors are considered. It is suggested that the quality of the drug trial evidence base greatly depends on the how ethical, commercial and political priorities are set, and not merely on standardized techniques of data processing. Whether such standardized techniques are raising or lowering the quality of safety information about new drugs, and the protection of patients on clinical trials is explored. It is revealed that these international standards, intended to define valid evidence-based medicine for drug trials, are not themselves robustly evidence-based. It is argued that the internationalized regulatory standards developed to frame the evidence base for drug safety and efficacy are frequently inconsistent with furthering patients’ well-being and public health. Rather, those standards reflect a regulatory culture of neoliberal corporate bias, and have been powerfully shaped by the commercial and political interests of the pharmaceutical industry and regulatory institutions. It is questionable that regulatory agencies are thoroughly and robustly scrutinizing the claims that pharmaceutical firms make about their products. New political and regulatory arrangements that could facilitate more ethical drug trials in the interests of patients and public health are proposed.