The conclusion of the book draws together the findings from the statistical analysis and the case studies, suggesting possible nuances and extensions to the theoretical framework. It further explores the financial statecraft of borrowers through short accounts of external finance and aid negotiations in Uganda, Senegal, and Laos. The chapter spells out policy implications of the argument, suggesting steps that policymakers in developing countries can take to derive the greatest benefit from their portfolio of external finance, as well as ways that traditional donor agencies can maintain and enhance their relevance. It concludes with reflections on the pertinence of the book's findings for developing countries in debt crisis, including those negotiating debt relief with diverse creditors.

This chapter outlines the theoretical framework of the financial statecraft of borrowers, drawing on bargaining frameworks to develop expectations for how a diversified portfolio of external finance enhances a country's leverage in aid negotiations with traditional donors. The chapter begins with donors' and recipients' preferences in negotiations, highlighting that donors have strategic and institutional reasons to provide development assistance, which leads them to compete in a marketplace for aid. When recipient countries diversify their portfolios of external finance, this diminishes their reliance on traditional donors and donors risk losing influence, in turn encouraging donors to provide more attractive aid. However, recipients vary in their ability to exploit this leverage, which depends on their strategic significance to donors and donor trust in their credibility.

The introduction previews the argument that developing countries can use borrowing relationships to their advantage. It situates this argument about the financial statecraft of borrowers within the literature on sovereign debt, foreign aid, and African politics. It explains the specific focus on sub-Saharan Africa by outlining three dynamics that enabled African governments to diversify their portfolios of external finance in the early twenty-first century: debt relief, Chinese lending, and liquidity in international bond markets. The chapter describes the book's mixed-methods research design, combining statistical analysis of the terms of aid agreements with three case studies of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Ghana. Finally, the chapter highlights how the financial statecraft of borrowers contributes to debates on financial interdependence, multipolarity, and the agency of developing countries.