This chapter addresses an inevitable question: How are later books of the Republic, and specifically Book 4, related to Book 1? It contends that justice as conceived in Book 1 is “external,” concerned with how one entity regards and treats another, and so is at odds with the novel definition of justice in Book 4, according to which it is “internal,” a matter of what happens within a single entity, whether a city or a soul. It is argued that in Book 4, Socrates, having been tasked with persuading Glaucon and Adeimantus that there is profit in being just, identifies a reward for being just, namely, the harmonious internal state of city and soul. Although he briefly calls this healthy and therefore desirable condition “justice,” he more frequently and aptly identifies it as “moderation.” This chapter makes the case that it is the account of justice found in Book 1 that more closely reflects Socrates’ (or Plato’s) understanding of it.

This chapter establishes the philosophical value of Republic 1 and challenges the widely held assumption that the later books, 2–10, represent Plato’s real views. It notes that some scholars, seeing Rep. 1 as lacking gravitas – in both style and content – think it was originally not even part of the Republic; others see it as introducing ideas to be developed later; a third group sees it as introduced only to be rebuffed. The case is made for reading the Republic forward – that is, reading what comes later in light of Rep. 1, rather than reading Rep. 1 in light of what comes later: Reading in this way makes it possible to doubt the sincerity of some of Socrates’ later proposals – in particular, the idea that justice is internal. An argument is made for taking seriously, philosophically, the dramatic elements of Rep. 1, including its humor. Finally, the views of Rep. 1’s three interlocutors are related to one another.