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2 results

  • 2 - Belief, Truth, and Knowledge

  • Peter J. Steinberger, Reed College, Oregon
  • Book:
    Rationalism in Politics
    Published online:
    11 August 2022
    Print publication:
    25 August 2022, pp 67-121

  • Summary

    Political rationslism presupposes foundations not only in tacit belief but in implicit belief as well. As such, its perforce engages notions of truth and justification. In such a context, Chapter 2 pursues post-Kantian notions of coherence, internatlism, and holism regarding the problem of mind and world, especially as it plays out in public life.

  • Confusion is corruptive belief in false identity

  • Elmar Unnsteinsson
  • Journal:
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy / Volume 46 / Issue 2 / April 2016
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2020, pp. 204-227

  • Speakers are confused about identity if they mistake one thing for two or two things for one. I present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model. I show how a prominent objection to Fregean models fails and argue that confusion consists in having false implicit beliefs involving the identity relation. Further, I argue that confused identity has characteristic corruptive effects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication.