This chapter delves into the question of the impact of extraterritorial and secondary sanctions on private contractual relations. It opens with a discussion of the characterisation of extraterritorial and secondary sanctions as potential legal or factual impediments to the performance of contractual obligations. A detailed analysis of the case law follows, bringing to the fore some degree of reluctance on the part of judicial authorities to allow operators to suspend the performance of their contractual obligations or to terminate contractual relations on account of their exposure to extraterritorial or secondary sanctions, at least in the absence of sanctions or force majeure contractual clauses. The chapter also explores the potential tension between such sanctions, on the one hand, and measures – commonly referred to as blocking statutes – enacted by states or by the EU to thwart their effects, on the other hand. A discussion, in this respect, of the relevant case law reveals a quest for a balance between policy objectives and economic soundness and shows the existence of incongruent views on the compatibility of sanctions clauses with blocking statutes.

The chapter analyzes the organization of the Soninke’s resistance and its various forms. It shows how through high tariff barriers, taxes on caravans of captives, taxes on trips to the gold mines, assassinations, political alliances, and control over the circulation of information, the Bacili weakened French trading activities and also dissuaded slave traders in captives from entering Gajaaga. Assassinations in particular were a frequent strategy used by the Soninke in Gajaaga to eliminate French agents and their local allies from negotiations. The Bacili additionally utilized tactics of dispersion and impediment. Dispersing captives consisted of attacking the caravans and freeing the captives, allowing them to escape to Gajaaga, Bambuxu or Futa Toro. The Soninke also deliberately impeded Europeans commercial operations. The Bacili held back European ships in villages for as long as possible by stretching out negotiations on the taxes required for passage, thus exposing them to epidemics, of which they died in large numbers.