Given recent data regarding fishing vessels switching off their Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) in the Western Indian Ocean, this article assesses the potential illegality of the practice by analysing national and international legislation. It shows that the enforcement of AIS laws is generally poor, and although these are becoming increasingly robust in some jurisdictions, the sanctions are not severe enough to act as deterrents. Furthermore, this article suggests that the insurance industry enables the practice of switching off AIS through weak due diligence practices. Insurers have a role to play in curbing such illegal behaviour, and it is not discretionary.

Punitive measures taken against vessels listed on RFMO IUU vessel lists often have very direct effects on the individuals associated with those vessels, such as the owner or operator. With developments such as cross-listing mechanisms and cross-references in international agreements, the number of actors that are encouraged or obliged to take measures against listed vessels now extends to a much wider group, well beyond just the Members of the listing RFMO. The impacts of these punitive measures on such individuals are accordingly very significant. Despite this, however, these listing procedures contain relatively limited due process features. This article considers whether this could contribute to diminishing the perceived legitimacy of IUU listings and generate a risk of reluctance by some actors within the international community to impose punitive measures on listed vessels.

Movement towards enhanced due process in decision-making processes appears to be emerging within many international organizations in recognition of the fact that increasingly, individuals are directly affected by decisions of international organizations. Examining such developments in other fora, this article considers possible adjustments to listing procedures, which might assist in safeguarding the legitimacy and effectiveness of IUU vessel lists. IUU lists play a significant role in international efforts to combat IUU fishing, and upholding their effectiveness is accordingly of critical importance.

Birds are commonly entangled in long-line fisheries, and increases in long-line fishing activity have consistently caused declines in seabird populations. Environmental criminology would posit that the risk of such declines is greater in the case of illegal long-line fisheries, which are less likely to implement bycatch mitigation measures. To investigate this possibility we examined the overlap between data on illegal fishing and albatross at-sea occurrence ranges. Moderate correlations were found between mean exposure to illegal fishing and the Red List status of albatross species, but none were found between Red List status and total fishing pressure. A second analysis overlaid albatross at-sea occurrence ranges with long-lining data for the member countries of the Convention on Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna to compare the effect of exposure to legal and illegal hooks on Red List status. Lacking a better measure, Country A's hooks were used as a proxy for illegal hooks. Critically Endangered and Endangered species were 12 and 3.4 times more exposed to illegal hooks, respectively, than Near Threatened species, whereas there was no relationship between Red List status and exposure to legal hooks. Country-level analyses confirmed these findings, which provide evidence that illegal long-line fishing poses a particular threat to the survival of albatrosses. The findings suggest that the bird conservation lobby should work closely with fisheries authorities to tackle illegal fishing, and that research should identify the highest risk areas of overlap between illegal fishing and albatross at-sea ranges.

Illegal exploitation of resources is a cause of environmental degradation worldwide. The effectiveness of conservation initiatives such as marine protected areas relies on users' compliance with regulations. Although compliance can be motivated by social norms (e.g. peer pressure and legitimacy), some enforcement is commonly necessary. Enforcement is expensive, particularly in areas far from land, but costs can be reduced by optimizing enforcement. We present a case study of how enforcement could be optimized at Cocos Island National Park, Costa Rica, an offshore protected area and World Heritage Site. By analysing patrol records we determined the spatial and temporal distribution of illegal fishing and its relationship to patrol effort. Illegal fishing was concentrated on a seamount within the Park and peaked during the third year-quarter, probably as a result of oceanographic conditions. The lunar cycle in conjunction with the time of year significantly influenced the occurrence of incursions. The predictability of illegal fishing in space and time facilitates the optimization of patrol effort. Repeat offenders are common in the Park and we suggest that unenforced regulations and weak governance are partly to blame. We provide recommendations for efficient distribution of patrol effort in space and time, establishing adequate governance and policy, and designing marine protected areas to improve compliance. Our methods and recommendations are applicable to other protected areas and managed natural resources.

Illegal fishing has detrimental environmental and social impacts, but these effects are difficult to mitigate without reliable estimates of fisher non-compliance. Methods used by fisheries managers to estimate illegal fishing often require indirect estimation of poaching using biological, economic or sociological indicators. This study presents a unique application of the randomized response technique (RRT) for direct estimation of non-compliance in fisheries to the Northern California recreational red abalone (Haliotis rufescens) fishery. An anonymous paper-based compliance and sociodemographic survey of recreational fishers in Sonoma and Mendocino Counties estimated 29% non-compliance with the daily take limit, 23% with the minimum size limit, 19% with licensing laws and 15% with the annual take limit. RRT results also indicated how different sociodemographic characteristics related to non-compliance. Visitors had higher non-compliance rates than local fishers for all regulations except daily take limits, which an estimated 72% of locals violated versus 18% of visitors. High fisher awareness of regulations, fisher age, income and fishing experience did not appear to influence illegal take. RRT is a powerful tool which can aid conservation managers in prioritizing action.

The jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to hear applications for the prompt release of vessels and crew was recently invoked by the Russian Federation against Australia in the Volga case. In determining whether the bonding arrangements set by Australia were ‘reasonable’ under Article 73(2) of UNCLOS, the Tribunal clarified several issues regarding prompt release applications, and most significantly, held that non-financial conditions and ‘good behaviour bonds’ were not permissible. In rendering its decision, the Tribunal adhered to the ‘guiding criterion’ of balancing the interests of the flag state and coastal state in determining the reasonableness of the bond. It is submitted that this test is inappropriate, and that this decision will create difficulties for coastal states seeking to control illegal fishing.