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Though many reports have assessed hospital emergency responses during a disaster that affected the facility's operations, relatively little work has been dedicated to identifying factors that aid or impede the recovery of such hospitals.
Problem:
On 05 October 2005, Hurricane Stan triggered landslides that buried an impoverished Mayan community in Santiago Atitlán, Guatemala. The six-bed Hospitalito Atitlán also was in the landslide's path. Though opened just months earlier, the institution maintained 24-hour services until reopening in a new facility only 15 days after the landslides.
Methods:
This qualitative study examined the Hospitalito Atitlán's disaster recovery using unstructured interviews with key hospital personnel and community members. Participant observation provided information about institutional and cultural dynamics affecting the hospital's recovery. Data were collected retrospectively during June–September 2006 and June 2007.
Results:
The Hospitalito's emergency responses and recovery were distinct endeavors that nonetheless overlapped in time. The initial 12 hours of disorganized emergency relief work was quickly succeeded by an organized effort by the institution to provide inpatient and clinic-based care to the few severely injured and many worried-well patients. As international aid started arriving 2–3 days post-landslide, the Hospitalito's 24-hour clinical services made it an integral organization in the comprehensive health response. Meanwhile, a subset of the Hospitalito's non-clinical staff initiated rebuilding efforts by Day 2 after the event, joined later by medical staff as outside aid allowed them to handoff clinical duties. Effective use of the Internet and conventional media promoted donations of money and supplies, which provided the raw materials used by a group determined to reopen their hospital.
Conclusions:
Early work by a recovery-focused team coupled with a shared understanding of the Hospitalito as an institution that transcended its damaged building drove the hospital's rapid post-emergency revival. Encouraging a similar sense of mission, emulating the Hospitalito's handling of funding and material procurement, and conducting rebuilding and relief efforts in parallel may aid recovery at other health facilities.
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