In this concluding chapter, the authors summarize the findings of the volume’s contributions and further develop the notion of the Weimar analogy as providing central clues about conceptions of modernity in the postwar era. It further emphasizes the multiple ways in which Weimar has been mobilized in different contexts, how it has worked as a cultural symbol, and why it has had such a profound impact on postwar political thinking in the West. The chapter, finally, expands on what we may take away from the studies in this volume for a more general understanding of the role of analogies and historical lessons for political thought.

Ahmed engages recent works that have sought to harness the lessons of Weimar to offer guidance to ailing democracies around the globe. Utilizing a Weberian evaluation of ideal types, it examines the model of democracy and democratic defense employed within these accounts. The chapter demonstrates that what they offer as a general or universal model of democracy defense, comes to reflect in its construction a very particular model that emerged in the postwar context of Cold War competition. This model, Ahmed argues, misconstrues the terrain of political conflict and misses opportunities to open up space for a revisioning of democracy that would serve as the basis of a more robust democratic defense.

I make two related claims: (1) assessments of stability made by political actors and analysts are largely hit or miss; and (2) that leader responses to fear of fragility or confidence in robustness are unpredictable in their consequences. Leader assessments are often made with respect to historical lessons derived from dramatic past events that appear relevant to the present. These lessons may or may not be based on good history and may or may not be relevant to the case at hand. Leaders and elites who believe their orders to be robust can help make their beliefs self-fulfilling. However, overconfidence can help make these orders fragile. I argue that leader and elite assessments of robustness and fragility are influenced by cognitive biases and also often highly motivated. Leaders and their advisors use information selectively and can confirm tautologically the lessons they apply.

We review our theoretical claims in light of the empirical chapters and their evidence that leader assessments matter, are highly subjective, and very much influenced by ideology and role models. They are also influenced by leader estimates of what needs to be done and their political freedom to act. This is in turn shows variation across leaders. The most common response to fragility is denial, although some leaders convince themselves – usually unrealistically – they can enact far-reaching reforms to address it.