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2 results

  • The Paradox of Graded Justification

  • Artūrs Logins
  • Journal:
    Episteme , First View
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    28 February 2023, pp. 1-29
    • Article
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  • According to a widely held view epistemic justification is a normative notion. According to another widely held assumption, epistemic justification comes in degrees. Given that gradability requires a context-sensitivity that normativity seems to lack, these two assumptions stand in tension. Giving up the assumption of gradability of justification represents a lesser theoretical cost.

  • Chapter 8 - Objections

  • Jonathan D. Payton, Bilkent University, Ankara
  • Book:
    Negative Actions
    Published online:
    11 February 2021
    Print publication:
    25 February 2021, pp 190-221

  • Summary

    I consider a range of objections to the identity of negative actions and positive events, which have appeared in the recent literature. Most of these objections are appeals to Leibniz’s Law: they attempt to show that a certain negative action can’t be identical to a certain positive event, because these entities have different properties (e.g. different spatiotemporal locations, modal profiles, or causal roles). I show that these objections rely on confusions (e.g. between the things we do and our particular doings of them, or between action sentences and nominals which purport to denote particular doings). Thus, we can (and in the light of the previous chapters, we should) identify negative actions with positive events.