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1 results

  • 5 - To Which Kind of Welfare Did Léon Walras Refer?

  • from Part I - Plurality of Welfare in the Making of Welfare Economics
  • Edited by Roger E. Backhouse, Antoinette Baujard, Tamotsu Nishizawa
  • Book:
    Welfare Theory, Public Action, and Ethical Values
    Published online:
    04 March 2021
    Print publication:
    25 March 2021, pp 118-134

  • Summary

    Léon Walras is often assumed, at least implicitly, to be a welfarist on the grounds that his work is generally considered to be the origin of the first social welfare theorems and therefore a forerunner of Pareto optimality. This chapter argues that such a view contradicts the basic foundations of Walras’s economic and social philosophy and especially his conceptions of society and of individuals. If we take seriously Walras’s distinction between “general social conditions” (“conditions sociales générales”) and “specific personal positions” (“positions personnelles particulières”), we can develop an alternative interpretation of his views on welfare, which leads in turn to a different, non-welfarist, conception of the Walrasian view of the state.