The formalisation of informal security-providers has important consequences for citizenship, the rule of law, and human rights. We examine these policies in Burkina Faso, where formalisation has led to concerns about vigilante justice and ethnic targeting. Although African governments' reliance on informal security provision is well-documented, less is known about the origins of formalisation policies. To advance theory-building in this domain, this paper examines the political logic of empowering self-defence groups through the study of Burkina Faso's 2022 junta government, with comparisons to two prior regimes. We argue that formalisation is not only a mechanism for overcoming vexing security challenges, but is a tool used by leaders to build legitimacy and strengthen the regime's grip on power. In doing so, the article contributes insights into the origins of governmental policies towards self-defence groups, with implications for the study of political legitimacy, security provision and citizen–state relations.

First-order formalisations are often preferred to propositional ones because they are thought to underwrite the validity of more arguments. We compare and contrast the ability of some well-known logics—these two in particular—to formally capture valid and invalid arguments. We show that there is a precise and important sense in which first-order logic does not improve on propositional logic in this respect. We also prove some generalisations and related results of philosophical interest. The rest of the article investigates the results’ philosophical significance. A first moral is that the correct way to state the oft-cited superiority of first-order logic vis-à-vis propositional logic is more nuanced than often thought. The second moral concerns semantic theory; the third logic’s use as a tool for discovery. A fourth and final moral is that second-order logic’s transcendence of first-order logic is greater than first-order logic’s transcendence of propositional logic.

Few mining countries face capacity building challenges comparable to Rwanda's. Worsened by the genocide, a 2009 report put the number of mining scientists in Rwanda at 40, fewer than four below the age of 40. The government has however recognized that local skills development is crucial to the potential of mining to contribute to the country's economic development. This has been demonstrated through a series of reforms, culminating in the mining code of 2014. This article considers two issues critical to capacity building in the mining sector: formalization of artisanal and small-scale mining and the promotion of local content / procurement. Its main thesis is that the code provides limited opportunities for local mining capacity building and its local content provisions are rather nervously worded. This is worsened by the fact that Rwanda has no freestanding local content legislation. The article calls for Rwanda to adopt such legislation, with specific provisions on local skills training.