On June 3, 2016, the African Court on Human and People's Rights (the Court) rendered its first default judgment, in a case brought by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Commission) against Libya for alleged violations of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Charter). The Commission had alleged that the Libyan government had violated its obligations under the Charter to protect one of its citizens, Saif al-Islam Kadhafi, from incommunicado detention and to provide him access to counsel. When Libya failed to respond to the Commission's complaint and to the Court's order of provisional measures, the Court proceeded to the merits and found Libya in violation of several articles of the Charter. Its decision reflected both a measured approach to the issuance of default judgments and an emphasis on the need for states to comply with their human rights obligations even in situations of exceptional political and security instability.

This article revisits the core difficulties with the international delict known as a denial of justice and, drawing insights from philosophical writing on adjudication, offers novel solutions to three principal issues: (a) the scope of the acts and omissions that can form the predicate conduct for a denial of justice; (b) the proper threshold for liability in respect of those acts or omissions; (c) the relationship between denial of justice and other international norms impacting upon domestic adjudication. The article concludes with a restatement of the law of denial of justice.

In the Diallo case, the ICJ was required to answer the question of whether the Republic of Guinea could exercise diplomatic protection not only on behalf of its national, Diallo, but also on behalf of two corporations which were incorporated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo but which were owned by a national of the Republic of Guinea. While the Court decided, in line with Barcelona Traction, that the exercise of diplomatic protection for violation of direct rights of shareholders was admissible, it did not accept the claim on behalf of the companies ‘by substitution’. In its reasoning it took a rather restrictive view of the existing exceptions to the rule that protection can only be exercised on behalf of nationals.

The Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals before the ICJ again involved violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The judgment seems to be a faithful copy of the earlier LaGrand judgment, but it is much less clear. In particular the Court's consideration of diplomatic protection, the nature of Mexico's claim, and the local remedies rule pose questions with respect to the development of international law. In considering these issues, this article aims to show why the Court should have paid more attention to the legal background of the case.

The last decade marked the unprecedented increase in the importance of the role of judicial bodies in the maintenance of international legal order and their assumption of hitherto unprecedented judicial powers. The principle of consent and its implications are the issues that pose major questions on possible limitations in this process. The tension between these conflicting factors has been witnessed in the treatment by the ICJ of the disputes related to the right of convicted foreign nationals to consular notification. In LaGrand, the Court made substantial advances in terms of diminishing the role of the principle of consent as an obstacle to proper judicial enforcement of international obligations. Avena – a similar case – demonstrates that such an approach has acquired an important degree of consistency in the ICJ's jurisprudence.

The individual in international law — Human rights and freedoms — Detention pending trial — Right to have such detention considered by a judge or other officer acting in a judicial capacity — Decision made by District Attorney who was also responsible for prosecution — Whether adequate safeguards — European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 5

Exhaustion of local remedies — Failure of Applicant to raise issue before municipal courts — European Convention incorporated into municipal law — Article 26